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ABSTRACT 
How can the FBI improve the recruitment of sources within terrorist groups, 
specifically al-Qaeda?  First, counter-ideological programs have application in source 
recruitment.  Second, a framework for recruiting terrorist sources is found in the work of 
Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins.  They suggest terrorists can be usefully categorized as 
internalists or externalists, or Types A and B.  Type A terrorists have insatiable appetites 
and display emotional aggression. Type B terrorists have instrumental aggression and 
“pragmatic world goals.” Significantly, research suggests terrorists displaying 
instrumental aggression, the Type B should be more “sensitive” to “objective rewards 
and punishments.”   
Two case studies demonstrate how to determine if a potential terrorist source is 
either a Type A or Type B individual.  This is accomplished by examining a potential 
source’s background to determine if they have instrumental or emotional aggression, their 
levels of risk and ideological commitment, their part-time or full-time commitment to 
jihad, and if they have high or low Social Intensity Syndrome.  The conclusion of this 
thesis is that the FBI should concentrate recruitments on the more pragmatic Type B 
terrorists.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The present FBI process for attempting to recruit terrorist sources is largely left to 
the success or failure of agents acting individually on their instincts, experiences and 
personal abilities.  How can the FBI organizationally improve the recruitment of human 
intelligence sources within terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda?  This thesis examines 
two interconnected tracks for improving source recruitments.  First, counter-ideological 
programs applying techniques causing terrorists defections and dissension have 
application in source recruitment.  Second, a cognitive framework for recruiting terrorist 
sources of intelligence may be found in the work of Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins of the 
RAND Corporation.  They suggest terrorists can be usefully categorized as internalists or 
externalists, or Types A and B.  Type A terrorists “are all driven by the action and 
passion itself.  Even when they clothe themselves in ostensible political objectives, their 
appetites for action have proven insatiable and they have changed objectives as necessary 
to continue.”  Type B terrorists have “pragmatic world goals” and “will cease terrorism 
when it is no longer needed.”  Al-Qaeda is largely comprised of Type As according to 
Davis and Jenkins. The authors argue that Type A terrorists display emotional aggression, 
while Type B terrorists have instrumental aggression. “Emotional aggression is 
associated with anger and does not calculate long-term consequences.” Instrumental 
aggression is for a purpose.  Significantly for this thesis, psychologist Clark McCauley 
writes that the “response to the individual behavior of terrorists may be linked to 
differences between emotional and instrumental aggression: ‘emotional aggression 
should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental 
aggression more sensitive.” Two case studies demonstrate how to determine if a potential 
terrorist source is either a Type A or Type B individual.   
This is accomplished by examining a potential source’s background to determine 
if they have instrumental or emotional aggression, their levels of risk and ideological 
commitment, their part-time or full-time commitment to jihad, and if they have high or 
low Social Intensity Syndrome (SIS). SIS, the emergent work of renowned psychologist 
Phil Zimbardo, is primarily concerned with the need for men to be associated with other 
 xiv
men in “certain male dominated social groupings,” of which a terrorist group would be 
included.  The more recruitable Type Bs, when compared to their Type A counterparts, 
display instrumental aggression, have lower levels of risk and ideological commitment, 
have part-time commitment to jihad, and display low levels of SIS. The conclusion of this 
thesis is that FBI source recruitment efforts against al-Qaeda terrorists will be more 
successful when they are focused on the more pragmatic Type B terrorists. Type B 
terrorists are found in the peripheral functions of terrorist organizations, consistent with 
their comparatively lower levels of risk and ideological commitment (as compared to 
their Type A counterparts).  However, their access to intelligence is not necessarily 
inferior. As a consequence of their attachment to the peripheral functions of terrorist 
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The events of September 11th have forever changed our nation and the 
FBI.  Since that terrible day, the FBI’s overriding priority has been 
protecting America by preventing further attacks. (2004, p. 1) 
Director Robert Mueller on FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009 
How exactly will the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) prevent further 
terrorist attacks, especially by al-Qaeda?1 How will the FBI find potential al-Qaeda 
sleeper-cells in the United States?  How will the FBI successfully counter the transition 
by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to less hierarchical organizational structures and 
boundaries? How will the FBI contend not just with al-Qaeda the group, but with al-
Qaeda the movement—a movement which can inspire Muslims without previous records 
of jihadist activity to process into terrorists and metastasize into deadly terrorist cells?   
An argument can be made that a tremendous amount of the FBI’s energy since 
9/11 has been geared to re-structuring the organization to be more responsive to 
combating al-Qaeda and other terrorist threats, reflective of Director Mueller’s focus on 
the FBI’s new “overriding priority” to prevent further attacks.  There are new counter-
terrorism units within the FBI, new agent career paths focused on counter-terrorism, new 
intelligence groups within each FBI division, new counter-terrorism training, new 
computer systems to handle counter-terrorism intelligence, more agents working 
terrorism, better cooperation with the CIA and more agents working overseas, to mention 
but a few of the laudable changes from the pre-9/11, FBI environment.  But, as one recent 
RAND report noted, “Whatever else it achieves, reorganization does not predictably yield 
better analysis and operational decision making, which depend on how and how well 
people think rather than how their bureaus are organized” (Gompert, 2007, p. 14). As 
David Gompert of the RAND Corporation noted:  
                                                 
1The transliteration of “al-Qaeda” leads to many spellings. “Al-Qaeda” will be the transliteration used 
in this thesis, unless contained within a quote.  
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Recognition of the centrality of cognitive performance in insurgency and 
COIN (counter-insurgency) is also a reminder of the limits of 
organizational ‘solutions.’ Confidence in structuring for success is a 
product of the United States’ corporate mentality and its 20th-century 
success in organizing to win industrial-territorial war, especially World 
War II and the Cold War. Already, it is apparent that restructuring to 
counter global insurgency is at best insufficient and at worst a distraction. 
There is no denying that after 9/11, U.S. homeland security needed to be 
organized for better focus on global counterinsurgency and that U.S. 
intelligence agencies needed to be connected for better information 
sharing. However, when countering a dynamic threat, faith in structure is 
faith misplaced. (2007, pp. 13, 14) 
While some FBI reorganization and change are appropriate, an alternative and 
arguably more focused, approach to improving the FBI’s counter-terrorism capacity with 
respect to al-Qaeda is to advance the FBI’s successful recruitment and handling of human 
intelligence sources (HUMINT). Having more HUMINT within al-Qaeda is an obvious 
path to knowing in advance the intentions and the capabilities of this group.  How is this 
desirable end-state to be accomplished?  The solution is not as simple as mandating that 
agents recruit more terrorism sources. 
For veteran MI-5 counter-terrorism professional Paul Smith, (2008) 
improvements in the capability to infiltrate al-Qaeda via human sources are critical to the 
early detection and prevention of future terrorist attacks and the eventual demise of this 
threat.  Defense commentator Shawn Brimley wrote in his article, “Tentacles of Jihad: 
Targeting Transnational Support Networks,” that “human intelligence is the sine qua non 
of victory against al Qaeda and its affiliates…”(2006, p. 40).  
With its long-history of using sources to combat other types of sophisticated 
criminal organizations, the FBI also understands the value of this method to combat al-
Qaeda.  As an organization, the FBI recognizes the need to have more terrorist sources, 
but has given less thought to how this process really works and limited practical guidance 
to field agents to assist them in their recruitment efforts. Agents acting instinctively, 
based upon years of experience, involving as many failures as successes, are the 
backbone of the FBI’s current efforts to recruit these invaluable terrorism sources.   
Unfortunately, when an agent with successful experiences recruiting and operating 
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quality terrorism sources retires, leaves the FBI, moves into management, or other jobs 
within the FBI not connected to counter-terrorism, their expertise is lost.  As it stands, 
there is no clear understanding within the FBI of the underlying principles or processes 
for recruiting al-Qaeda sources. And, there is equally no process for taking the 
experiences of agents successful in this critical arena and teaching it to others.  This may 
be because it is difficult to teach an art or instinct, especially one that is so imprecisely 
understood, even by those who have demonstrated some success.  At some level, what 
works for the individual FBI agent who successfully recruits terrorist sources must be 
better understood organizationally, so the process can be measured, improved, and 
ultimately taught to future generations of counter-terrorism professionals.      
Far more effort is currently expended organizationally on providing training to 
agents on the legalities of source recruiting and the processing of bureaucratic paperwork 
associated with this complicated and crucial endeavor than on planning recruitment 
operations or teaching agents how to recruit terrorism sources.2  There is not an existing 
replicable recruitment process, a formalized “post-mortem” of successful and failed 
recruitment efforts, or a set of metrics to determine how well the FBI is performing in 
this critical area.   
If improved human intelligence through better source recruitment is the answer to 
preventing future attacks, where should the FBI begin to look for improvements?  The 
broad focus of this thesis is to initiate an academic discussion in search of practical 
answers to the tyranny of an immediate counter-terrorism need.  In essence, this thesis 
addresses this question: How can the FBI improve the recruitment of human sources of 
intelligence within terrorist groups, specifically al-Qaeda? 
The recruitment of a human source shares some of the properties of a “wicked 
problem” (Rittel and Webber, 2004). Each potential recruitment target is an individual 
whose different nature and nurture have shaped a unique identity. Similarly, “Every 
wicked problem is essentially unique” (Rittel and Webber, 2004, p. 164). Consequently, 
each recruitment effort is a unique affair, regardless of similarities in ethnicities, religion 
                                                 
2Based on the author’s experience as an FBI agent assigned to counter-terrorism investigations since 
January 1998.  
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or language.  Another characteristic of wicked problems is that the cost of failure is high. 
“Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation;’ because there is no 
opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly” Rittel and 
Webber, 2004, p. 163).  This characteristic of a wicked problem is certainly true in 
attempts to recruit terrorism sources. In a failed recruitment attempt, the FBI’s interests in 
that individual and his associates are exposed.  This may lead that person to alert others 
to the threat posed by the FBI and to take security steps to further obfuscate his past, 
current and future activities.3   
Any FBI agent or CIA case officer who has attempted recruitments on known or 
suspected terrorists or their associates is aware that the recruitment approach used so 
successfully in one instance is no guarantee of future success. To believe, then, that a 
cook-book approach to source recruitment is possible (or even desirable) is unrealistic; 
that is not the intention of this paper.  Nor is this paper a detailed study of al-Qaeda or its 
affiliates, but some familiarity of al-Qaeda and terrorism is assumed of the reader.  This 
paper is also not intended to be a purely academic exercise on the study of the 
psychological or sociological underpinnings of radical Islamic terrorism.   
What this thesis does intend to accomplish is to suggest the application of 
important lessons learned from various areas to improving how the FBI thinks about 
terrorism source recruitment in four areas:  
 Developing better comprehension concerning whom the FBI should target 
as potential al-Qaeda source recruitments. 
 Understanding why recruitment efforts against certain individuals are 
more likely to succeed or fail. 
 Providing practical guidance to FBI agents on where they should begin 
their search for promising recruitment candidates, which is enhanced by 
an understanding of points one and two. 
 Providing practical suggestions for approaching the recruitment target.   
                                                 
3 Based on the experiences of the author working with terrorist source recruitment for the FBI from 
1998-present.  
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Following this introduction, this paper proceeds by first defining what is meant by 
the term “al-Qaeda” and what constitutes a “recruited source.” Next, lessons are drawn 
from four case-studies of on-going counter-ideological programs in non-Western 
countries targeting al-Qaeda or groups associated with al-Qaeda. The discussion then 
turns to lessons drawn from the fields of psychology and sociology that are applicable to 
source recruitment. Specifically discussed are the differences between Type A and B 
terrorists, instrumental and emotional aggression, risk and commitment, lessons from the 
Madrid train bombings, and Social Intensity Syndrome.  One explanation for recruitment 
failures of the right terrorists, Correspondent Inference Theory, is also discussed.   The 
applicability of these lessons is then demonstrated through two case studies of individuals 
with known connections to al-Qaeda.    
The conclusion of this thesis, predicated on these lessons and illustrated by the 
case studies, is that FBI recruitment efforts against al-Qaeda should be focused on a 
particular type of terrorist—the Type B. Indicators associated with Type B terrorists are 
discernable to agents through existing investigative methods, as opposed to impractical 
clinical observations and testing. Type B terrorists are more accessible (both physically 
and mentally) to the FBI and are more likely to cooperate as sources. Their Type A 
counterparts are predicted to be more inclined to reject an FBI recruitment approach, 
even when this is against their best interests and self-preservation. 
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II. DEFINING AL-QAEDA AND RECRUITED SOURCES 
Before proceeding with a review of the academic lessons which are posited in this 
thesis as having practical applications for field agents in identifying the Type B terrorists 
who are more susceptible to recruitment, it is necessary to provide two key definitions.  
First, what or who is an “al-Qaeda” terrorist?  Second, what constitutes a “recruited 
source” for the purposes of this discussion? 
A. WHO IS AN AL-QAEDA TERRORIST? 
Renowned terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has delineated al-Qaeda into four 
categories reflecting a decreasing level of sophistication (2006).  Hoffman’s categories 
are as follows: 
1. Al-Qaeda Central  
This is the al-Qaeda which many probably think of when the name of this group is 
mentioned.  It is Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and those full-time al-Qaeda 
members who existed with the organization prior to 9/11 (Hoffman, 2006). This category 
is the most sophisticated because it is home to the group’s “professional cadre: the most 
dedicated, committed, and absolutely reliable element of the movement” (Hoffman, 
2006). The professional cadre is responsible for the signature terrorist attacks of the 
organization on the scale of 9/11 and the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania (Hoffman, 2006). This cadre may employ local terrorists in 
support roles in these “spectacular” attacks, but it is this cadre that is in charge (Hoffman, 
2006, p. 286). In many instances, but not always, full-time members have secretly 
pledged their bayat or fealty to Usama Bin Ladin (National, 2004, pp. 67, 470). The 
access of these full-time al-Qaeda members to insider information about the group’s 
activities is based upon their direct participation in these activities and through 
communications with other full-time members.  
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2. Al-Qaeda Affiliates and Associates  
For Hoffman, this category “embraces formally established insurgent or terrorist 
groups who over the years have benefited from Usama Bin Laden’s largess and/or 
spiritual guidance and/or have received training, arms, money, and other assistance from 
al-Qaeda” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 286). Hoffman lists over ten terrorist groups from across 
the globe that fall within this category such as Jemaah Islamiya and Laskar-e-Tayyiba 
(2006, p. 286.) 
3. Al-Qaeda Locals  
This “amorphous” group represents “al-Qaeda adherents” who are likely to have 
had terrorism experience and who may have participated in one or more jihads around the 
world (Hoffman, 2006, p. 287).  The unique aspect of this group is that its members have 
a connection to al-Qaeda, even if these connections are “tenuous” or “dormant” 
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 287). 
4. Al-Qaeda Network  
This category represents “homegrown Islamic radicals” (Hoffman, 2006, p.287).  
They may be from the Maghreb, Middle East, Europe, or even North and South America.  
Converts to Islam are found in this category (Hoffman, 2006).  Individuals in this 
category have no direct connection with al-Qaeda or any other identifiable terrorist group 
(Hoffman, 2006). Examples might include the attackers in the March 11, 2004 Madrid 
train attacks (Hoffman, 2006).  These individuals may see themselves as extensions of al-
Qaeda, which is “more inspirational than actual” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 288). However, they 
may not be able to provide any intelligence or access to formal al-Qaeda members. Still, 
as the Madrid attack demonstrates, they can act with deadly effect and are ignored or 
underestimated at great risk.  Al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna supports this view.  In 




global infrastructure and membership per se but in its overarching and highly appealing 
ideology” (Gunaratna, 2005, p. 59). This is the least sophisticated of Hoffman’s al-Qaeda 
categories.  
Other useful characterizations of al-Qaeda also exist, which demonstrate the 
diverse nature of this group and the threat it poses. The British government, for instance, 
has developed a practical, easy to understand three tier system used to “describe the 
varying degrees of connection between targets and the Al Qaida leadership” (Murphy, 
2005, p. 27).   
‘Tier 1’ describing individuals or networks considered to have direct links 
with core Al Qaida; ‘Tier 2’, individuals or networks more loosely 
affiliated with Al Qaida; ‘Tier 3’, those without any links to Al Qaida who 
might be inspired by their ideology. (Murhpy, 2005, p. 27) 
Throughout this paper, when referring to “al-Qaeda,” this refers simultaneously to 
one or more of Hoffman’s categories, unless a specific category is otherwise noted.  
B. WHAT IS A RECRUITED SOURCE? 
To posture that an individual has been “recruited” is to say that they are witting of 
a cooperative arrangement, formal or informal, between themselves and the FBI for the 
purpose of providing useful intelligence to the FBI on a specific target or issue.4  Usually, 
the recruited source is tasked with collecting or providing intelligence on particular 
matters. Cooperation can occur for numerous reasons. A terrorist or other type of 
recruited agent may agree to cooperate for short-term, pragmatic reasons, through a 
complete rejection of his or her previous ideology, for money, revenge, adventure, 
avoidance of criminal prosecution or deportation, or even recognition that his or her goals 
can be met through non-violent means, among countless other reasons.  Generally, this 
cooperative agreement is secret, allowing the source to continue simultaneously 
providing intelligence to the FBI while maintaining his or her access to the source of the 
intelligence as a loyal member.  
                                                 
4 The bureaucratic FBI formalities of recruiting and vetting sources are outside of the scope and 
interest of this paper.  
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On occasion, an individual will be recruited as a witness in a criminal trial.  
Intelligence professionals accustomed to only working with “true” intelligence sources 
might scoff at the thought of a witness being referred to as a recruited source, but the FBI 
has both intelligence and prosecutorial responsibilities.5  In many instances, the use of 
criminal prosecutions is one of the few legal, efficient, and lasting remedies for 
neutralizing a suspected terrorist member or supporter who is an American citizen or 
permanent legal resident. Court witnesses, for purposes of this paper, can still be 
considered recruitment sources if they provide intelligence. In many instances, their 
relationship with the FBI as a witness can be protected for long periods of time before 
exposure through judicial processes, although their future access to intelligence is largely 
curtailed by their public association with the FBI when they fulfill their witness role.  
However, even if a terrorist source cooperating as a witness provides nothing more than 
historical information about al-Qaeda, this intelligence can still be exceptionally valuable 
in generating leads to identify and uncover hidden al-Qaeda members, activities, and 
modus operandi.   
A successfully recruited al-Qaeda source may provide exceptional, actionable 
intelligence, but will almost certainly disagree with U.S. foreign policy, Western culture 
and norms, the perceived treatment of Muslims around the world, and any other number 
of social, political, and religious issues.  A key, universal point to all al-Qaeda terrorist 
sources is that their willingness to cooperate with the FBI should never be confused with 
the conversion of that individual’s religion, values, or way of thinking.  Professor 
Zachary Abuza, who was commenting on his study of a promising Indonesian 
government program to rehabilitate captured Jamah Islamiyah terrorists (al-Qaeda 
affiliates and associates by Hoffman’s categorization), which is discussed later, captured 
this point.  He noted, "At the end of this program, you are probably still going to have 
someone who is committed to the establishment of sharia, who is probably still going to 
be less than friendly toward non-Muslims and ethnic minorities" (as cited in Bennett, 
2008). A successful recruitment, then, is not equivalent to a wholesale ideological 
                                                 
5 Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, identifies the intelligence elements of 
the FBI as part of the U.S. Intelligence Community.  
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conversion of an individual, but nor is conversion either necessary or the goal to source 
recruitments.  What counts is the potential source’s pragmatic willingness to engage in a 
cooperative arrangement to provide accurate, useful intelligence.  For these reasons, even 
a detained prisoner or witness may be regarded as a valuable recruited source for the 
purposes of this paper.    
As Hoffman’s categories above and the ensuing discussion might suggest, for this 
thesis, what is counted as an al-Qaeda terrorist and source, are intentionally broad.  This 
is because the intent of this paper is to discuss the recruitment of individuals with 
potentially valuable intelligence in meeting the FBI’s overriding priority of “preventing 
further attacks against the United States” (FBI, 2004, p. 1). Whether these individuals are 
the “professional cadre” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 286) of al-Qaeda Central, part of the al-
Qaeda network of “homegrown Islamic radicals” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 287), long-term 
intelligence sources in the traditional, U.S. Intelligence Community sense, or witnesses 
for criminal prosecutions is important, but not the most important element in the 
development of a cognitive process for source recruitment. What is more important for 
this thesis is if an individual has access to actionable intelligence and if he exhibits 
factors suggesting that he can be successfully recruited so that this intelligence can be 
obtained and applied to the prevention of future terrorist attacks or the demise of a 
terrorist group.  
 12
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III. RECRUITMENT LESSONS DERIVED FROM CURRENT 
COUNTER-IDEOLOGICAL PROGRAMS 
The future survival of the Islamist networks will depend on the continuing 
appeal of its radical ideology that sustains a fledgling global support 
network.  In the virtual absence of counterpropaganda, both literate and 
illiterate Muslims view the global jihad ideology as being compatible with 
Muslim theology. (Gunaratna, 2007, pp. 182-183) 
Rohan Gunaratna 
Within the rubric of the widely-applied term “al-Qaeda” are groups and 
individuals with differing levels of terrorism sophistication and connectivity to the pre-
9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist group personified by Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman Zawahiri 
(Hoffman, 2006). What links all of these al-Qaeda manifestations, regardless of their 
level of sophistication or connectedness to al-Qaeda Central, is an adherence to violent 
radical Islamic ideologies expressed in acts of terrorism.   
This chapter examines the counter-ideological programs currently underway in 
Singapore, Indonesia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.  This author prefers the term “counter-
ideological” over “de-radicalization” or “rehabilitation” to express the intent of these 
programs.  All of these terms are used to refer to essentially the same intended efforts of 
changing mind- sets and preventing terrorism from developing.  But de-radicalization and 
rehabilitation seem more specifically geared to addressing incarcerated terrorists while 
“counter-ideological” is broader in its potential applications, including source 
recruitment.  The counter-ideological programs discussed in this chapter, have to varying 
degrees, been publically touted as successful models in combating the radical Islamic 
ideologies which provide a violent voice for perceived anti-Muslim injustices. 
Radical Islamic ideologies are generating what terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman 
has classified as the “Al-Qaeda Network” (2006, p. 287). Because these home-grown 
radicals act more out of inspiration than any connectivity to bona-fide al-Qaeda cells 
(Hoffman, 2006) and even after the current idols of al-Qaeda Central are eventually cast 
down, new generations of terrorists nurtured on this global jihadist ideology are likely to 
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perpetuate the terrorism cycle until the jihadist message is repudiated. Even for 
individuals who are not counter-terrorism specialists, it is easy to see the logic behind 
arguments suggesting that al-Qaeda has become more and more a decentralized 
organization held together with ideological glue (Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006).   
The New York City Police Department, in its analysis of five terrorism cases 
within the United States, concluded that “the potential terrorist or group of terrorists 
begin and progress through a process of radicalization” (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 5).  A 
component of this process is a reliance on the influence of radical ideologies.  Drawing 
on open-source biographies of 172 participants in what he calls the “global Salafi jihad,” 
Marc Sageman (2004, pp. vii-ix) concluded the following regarding the “recruitment” of 
terrorists in this movement: 
I have described the process of joining the jihad, rejecting the common 
notions of recruitment and brainwashing to account for the process.  
Instead, I argue for a three-prong process: social affiliation with the jihad 
accomplished through friendship, kinship, and discipleship, progressive 
intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the global 
Salafi jihad ideology [underscore added]; and formal acceptance to the 
jihad through the encounter of a link to the jihad. (Sageman, 2004, p. 135) 
According to the noted scholar Gilles Kepel, “In academic parlance, the term 
salafism denotes a school of though which surfaced in the second half of the nineteenth 
century as a reaction to the spread of European ideals. It advocated a return to the 
traditions of the devout ancestors (salaf in Arabic)” (Kepel, 2002, p. 219). But beyond its 
academic meaning, it meant more: 
In the eyes of the militants, the definition of the term was quite different: 
salafists were those who understood the injunctions of the sacred texts in 
their most literal, traditional sense.  Their most notable exponent was the 
great fourteenth-century ulema Ibn Taymiyya, whose work served as the 
primary reference for the Wahhabites.  The salafists were the real 
fundamentalists of Islam; they were hostile to any and all innovation, 




Other counter-terrorism commentators concur with al-Qaeda expert Rohan 
Gunaratna’s at the opening of this chapter that the ideological underpinnings of the 
radical Islamic jihadist threat must be undercut (2007).  Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan 
of Nanyang Technical University in Singapore had two significant points related to the 
significance of counter-ideological work.   
First, in his paper, “Key Considerations in Counter-ideological Work against 
Terrorist Ideology,” Hassan noted that “Counter-ideological work is also important in 
minimizing the threat of potential freelance terrorists, who may not be members of any 
group, but drawn into terrorism because they share the ideology or common grievances” 
(2006, p. 532).  
Second, he also noted the following:  
Terrorism is committed when opportunity, motivation and capability meet 
and ideology is one of many important elements that motivates a person to 
commit terrorism.  Muslim terrorists and Al Qaeda especially, are not 
excluded.  In fact, the role of ideology is especially significant for Al 
Qaeda and its associates.  Prevention of terrorism requires the elimination 
of at least one of the three elements mentioned. One is motivation, which 
may be driven by ideology. (Hassan, 2006, p. 535) 
Hassan identified five key goals for a counter-ideological response to the global 
salafi jihad. These goals provide a framework for understanding the objectives of a 
counter-ideological program, yet are sufficiently broad to accommodate varied national 
approaches to this problem which must encompass the reality of local societal, legal, 
economic, cultural, and other considerations impacting the practicality of its application. 
The key goals are as follows:   
 Immunize general Muslims from extremist ideology 
 Persuade less fanatic members of terrorist groups to abandon the ideology 
 Create doubt and dissension within terrorist organizations, 
 Rehabilitate detained terrorist members, and 
 Minimize non-Muslims’ anxiety and suspicion by presenting alternatives 
to terrorist ideology (Hassan, 2006, 535). 
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Examined for this thesis were the counter-ideological programs currently 
underway in Singapore, Indonesia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Through a comparative 
review of how these mostly Muslims countries are addressing their own radical Islamic 
threats, methods were identified which could be modified for application in the context of 
al-Qaeda source recruitment.   
Although there are other nations with counter-ideological approaches outside of 
these selected programs in this admittedly truncated review, including more politically 
and culturally akin Western nations, these particular countries were selected for several 
reasons.   
First, as a counter-ideological program of this nature invariably involves 
interpretations of the Islamic religion, a largely non-Western perspective, from largely 
Islamic countries, was preferred.  The rationale for this is straightforward, as noted by 
Muhammad Haniff and Kenneth George Pereire cogently stated:  
As al Qaeda and JI do not believe in Western Philosophy and ideals, it 
should be recognized that the ‘conventional lens’ originating from the 
West would not be able to prescribe the best refutation of their theological 
and juristic arguments.  Any meaningful approach should take into 
account the nature of their ideals, couched in juristic and jurisprudential 
pronouncements. (2006, p. 466) 
Second, several of the countries in this comparison have scored notable program 
successes, at least according to publically available information. For that reason alone, 
they deserve closer examination.  
Third, it is the author’s contention that program examples from allied Western 
nations in the Global War on Terrorism are more likely to be examined and known than 
those of non-Western nations.  This position is asserted based on the historic level of 
intelligence and police cooperation between the U.S. and its Western allies and the 




Although the identified best counter-ideological practices of Western nations are 
probably correctly perceived to be more immediately miscible in a U.S. model, it also 
may lead to ignorance and missed opportunities of valuable lessons from lesser known, 
non-Western counter-ideological programs.  
The four countries of this study include the most populous Muslim nations in the 
Arab and Islamic World in Egypt and Indonesia, respectively. The study includes Saudi 
Arabia, which is arguably the most influential state in Sunni religious matters, as al-
Qaeda and its offshoots are obviously Sunni groups. And this study includes a non-
Muslim, multi-cultural country in Singapore. How are the countries of Singapore, 
Indonesia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia combating the ideology of the global salafi jihad and 
what lessons might be extracted for improved al-Qaeda source recruitment? 
A. SINGAPORE—THE COMMUNITY APPROACH 
The Singaporean counter-ideological program is encompassed in Dr. Stephen 
Biddle’s views of terrorism as expressed in his article, “War Aims and War 
Termination.” Biddle is of a mind that “the center of gravity in the war against terrorism 
lies in the hearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims” (2006, p. 531).  
As a result of this view, the main thrust of Singapore’s program is aimed at 
insulating or “immunizing” the mainstream Muslim population within its borders from 
radical ideologies.  This is accomplished by providing Muslims with a “correct 
understanding of Islam so that they will not be easily influenced by the terrorists’ 
propaganda” (Hassan and Pereire, 2006, p. 466). The Singaporean aim is not an attempt 
to convert Muslims religiously or even to re-shape their views of the world through a 
non-Muslim lens, but rather to prevent fringe, radical ideologies from taking root within 





In the Singaporean program, the messenger for interpreting and projecting the 
“correct understanding of Islam” and the centerpiece of the country’s counter-ideological 
program is the “moderate” 6Singaporean Muslim Community (Hassan and Pereire, 2006). 
Haniff and Pereire were right to quickly assert the potential pitfall of the term 
“moderate.” They said, “Nevertheless, policy makers must note that while the broad 
moderate—radical categorization is a useful means of essentialising differing tendencies 
among Muslim leaders and scholars, one should be aware of the difficulty of 
distinguishing between “moderate” and “radical” because in reality such a neat 
dichotomy does not exist” (Hassan and Pereire, 2006, p. 468).  
As Ustaz Mohamed Bin Ali wrote, “…the [Singaporean] government was of the 
view that the primary responsibility of combating Al-Qaeda and JI’s ideologies should 
fall squarely on the shoulders of the [Singaporean] Muslim community” (Ali, 2009, p. 2). 
The result has been that the Singaporean Muslim Community has led the charge in 
combating extremism in the country via methods and organizations largely created within 
the community.  
The main organizational body representing the community’s efforts is the 
Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) (Ali, 2009).  The RRG was created when the 
Singaporean government approached the Muslim community in 2003, shortly after the 
arrests of the first cell of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists in Singapore, when the 
government sought the community’s assistance in counseling these terrorists (Hassan, 
2008).  The RRG is comprised of Islamic religious scholars, a judge from the 
Singaporean Islamic Sharia Court, Muslim volunteers from domestic Islamic groups, and 
Muslims serving as religious counselors (Ali, 2009).   
Broadly speaking, the RRG was tasked by the government to police its own 
community and to “speak out against the false ideology of hate being disseminated by al 
Qaeda and JI” (Ali, 2009, p. 461). More specifically, the RRG accomplishes this mission 
by examining the ideology of the JI, (Singapore’s primary Islamic terrorist threat) to 
 
                                                 
6 “Moderate” is only to be outdone as a manipulated word based on one’s political views by the word 
“terrorist.” 
 19
point out and correct religious misinterpretations via an education program for the 
Muslim community based on materials produced by the group (Ali, 2009). This aspect of 
the Singaporean program was recognized as the “direct” element.   
The indirect element of Singapore’s counter-ideological efforts revolved around 
an attempt to rehabilitate detained terrorists, which includes counseling them and 
simultaneously providing assistance to their families.  In January of 2006, the program 
claimed the successful limited release of four detainees and the complete return to society 
of two additional detainees (Hassan, 2006). In January 2008, the program cited that 19 of 
51 individuals, or 37 percent of individuals detained for their affiliation with the JI, have 
been returned to society after an average detention of only three years (Hassan, 2008). 
These figures imply Singapore’s program is moving in a positive direction. 
The terrorist group HAMAS, although not within the sphere of al-Qaeda, places a 
premium on ensuring group loyalty by providing assistance to the families of its prisoners 
and martyrs.7  The Singaporean government works in a similar manner with local Muslim 
groups to ensure the needs of the families of its incarcerated terrorists are met: 
These initiatives are important in helping to win over the hearts and minds 
of the detainees and their family members and to integrate them back into 
society.  It is particularly important to minimize the risks of the children 
being radicalized in the future by the detention of their fathers or by 
economic marginalization arising from disruptions to their education and 
loss of financial security. (Hassan, 2006, p. 3) 
Muslims counselors also serve to provide counseling to these detainees and 
families and to act as communication channels between the families, the incarcerated 
terrorists, and the government (Ali, 2009). It can be argued, that by interposing 
themselves in this fashion, the government, through the RRG, is creating a direct 
dependence of the terrorists on the Muslim community and an indirect dependence on the 
government for the livelihood of their families. This orchestrated dependence has 
potential applications for source recruitments.  
                                                 
7 Based on the author’s experiences via an investigation of HAMAS’ U.S.-based daw’a fronts, 
particularly the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development.   
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One scenario envisioned, which is patterned after the Singaporean model, 
involves FBI agents interposing themselves or even other already recruited sources 
between the terrorists (incarcerated or otherwise) and their families as a way of creating 
that direct dependence.8 One method for testing if this direct dependency is taking root 
would be for the FBI to make small, individually insignificant requests of the targeted 
terrorist concomitantly with support provided to their family.  At first, the provision of 
assistance to the terrorist’s family and the insignificant requests should not have any 
connections to obvious FBI intelligence needs. The first goal should be to simply create 
dependency and comfortableness within the relationship. Over time, the FBI’s requests 
would become incrementally more significant, corresponding to equally more significant 
support to the terrorist’s family. When the terrorist is making requests (not demands) of 
the agent or the recruited source interposed between he and their family, this might be an 
indication that dependency has been established. This process would culminate with a 
formal FBI request for cooperation when the relationship has moved into a comfortable 
pattern of simultaneously discussing potentially sensitive topics with the terrorist, such as 
past activities and associates, and meeting the needs of their family.  
Another interesting effort by the Singaporean community was a joint program 
established by the association of Muslim scholars in Singapore (PERGAS) and Islamic 
Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) to create the Asatizah Recognition System 
(Hassan, 2006).  This system, established in 2005, created a registry and set standards for 
teaching Islam by the country’s Muslim teachers (Hassan, 2006). Those teachers straying 
from propagating approved versions of Islam are struck from the registry (Hassan, 2006).  
This Asatizah Recognition System has obvious application for FBI source 
recruitment.  Through existing FBI community liaison programs, U.S.-based Muslim 
teachers and other community leaders could be requested to act in the best interests of 
their religion to identify imams and individuals teaching and following unacceptable, 
radical standards of Islam as they define radical, but certainly encompassing those 
                                                 
8 The author has personally observed the effectiveness of this orchestrated dependency on two 
occasions. These involved an admitted al-Qaeda member and an admitted HAMAS member. Details are 
omitted for security purposes. 
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individuals inciting violence. This approach would be significantly more focused than 
current requests of domestic Islamic communities to report to the FBI “suspicious 
activity,” “terrorism,” or unfounded suspicions of the affiliation of individuals with 
specific terrorist groups.    
Instead, the FBI would harness the energies of friendly religious and community 
leaders to identify potentially important theological differences and fault-lines within 
their communities which could be exploited by radicals. A request of this nature should 
be much more palatable for community partners to support. Through this more focused 
approach on ideological differences, community partners are being removed from the 
FBI’s unintentional, but uncomfortable requests to label their fellow Muslims as possible 
terrorists based upon their differing Islamic views.  
The community’s reporting criteria would no longer be which individual is 
suspected of being a member or supporting al-Qaeda (which may be impossible for them 
to factually support), but who is teaching and following unacceptable, radical standards 
of Islam which incite terror. Again, what constitutes “radical” Islam is measured by 
cooperating religious and community leaders, who are most knowledge about what is 
“normal” in their religion and community, not by FBI-defined standards.  
But surely a common element to be requested of the cooperative is the 
identification of those individuals who use their radical interpretations of Islam to 
ideologically support military or economic jihad.  Through this change, young 
impressionable men gravitating to the call of radicalized imams or those already under 
their “discipleship” could be identified and considered for source recruitment sooner, 
before they are fully incorporated into the terrorism process.  An added benefit would be 
improved placement of existing sources to focus sooner on the purveyors of the radical 
ideologies which breed jihadists.  
To a lesser degree, the objectives of Singapore’s program include three other 




attempting to persuade the less committed members of the global jihad movement to 
reconsider their views, to “rehabilitate” incarcerated terrorists, and to reach-out to non-
Muslims to allay their suspicions.   
The thought behind addressing the non-Muslim population is that improved 
understanding and communications across different segments of the Singaporean 
population will create a more united country. A more united Singapore, one with fewer 
tears within its social fabric, will be more difficult for terrorists and their ideologies to 
penetrate (Hassan and Pereire, 2006).   
Viewed through the lens of defeating al-Qaeda’s ideology, Singapore’s counter-
ideological approach has an admirable and unique quality. By taking a community 
approach to this problem, this generates community buy-in, especially when locally 
derived solutions are enacted.  In turn, the government and Muslim community are 
creating a hostile environment for jihadist ideologies and possible terrorists amongst, “the 
center of gravity in the war against terrorism...politically uncommitted Muslims” (Biddle, 
2006, p. 531). As Audrey Kurth Cronin noted, “Terrorist groups generally cannot survive 
without either active or passive support from a surrounding population” (2006. p. 27).    
Key then to understanding the Singaporean approach is to appreciate the 
centrality, if not the control, of the counter-ideological program by the Singaporean 
Muslim Community. In essence, Singapore’s response to the jihadist message has been to 
defer its judgment to the Muslim Community in identifying its own problems and 
allowing it to create its own solutions.   
B. INDONESIA — REHABILITATION OF TERRORISTS 
The focus of the Indonesian counter-ideological program stands in contrast to the 
community-focused Singaporean model.  Indonesia’s focus is specifically aimed at 
incarcerated terrorists, including those with blood on their hands for involvement in 
major terrorist attacks (Bennett, 2008).  
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The Indonesian effort is very direct in its efforts to “de-program” hardened 
terrorists (The Age, 2006).  According to Indonesia’s Ambassador to the United States, 
the objectives are “rehabilitation and treatment” of terrorists, aiming to return them to a 
pre-terrorism life, and to eliminate their return to terrorism upon their release 
(Parnohadiningrat, 2007). 
The messengers in this program are co-opted terrorists, who are used to influence 
their former associates to renounce their views (Bennett, 2008).  Boston Globe journalist 
Drake Bennett, who has studied this issue, believes the use of co-opted terrorists as the 
government’s messengers is advantageous as “…former extremists have much more 
credibility with current extremists than the relatively moderate imams brought in to talk 
to inmates in programs like Singapore’s and Saudi Arabia’s” (2008).  
Indonesia’s program has obtained noteworthy successes in the use of credible, 
convicted, high-profile terrorists like Nasir Abas and Ali Imron as co-opted terrorist 
messengers. On October 12, 2002, JI’s bombings of two nightclubs and in front of the 
U.S. Consulate on the island of Bali killed 202 people and wounded another 209 
(Australian Federal Police, 2002). Imron played a key role in these horrific attacks by 
loading and driving the explosives-laden van which was parked in front of one of the 
nightclubs that was attacked (O’Brien, 2007). Imron is now reportedly cooperating with 
Indonesian authorities from his prison cell to prevent future JI attacks by producing 
cassette recordings of sermons for use in his family’s East Java madrassa. These 
recordings address how his actions were a mistake and the “wrong kind of jihad” 
(O’Brien, 2007). What other intelligence he is providing cooperatively to the Indonesian 
authorities and others, such as the identity of other members, is open to speculation in the 
absence of information on such a potentially sensitive matter. Whether or not Imron’s 
current behavior is genuinely reflective of his remorse, or more cynically, an effort to 
obtain prison privileges, an early prison release, or even an effort to prevent his execution 
will undoubtedly be questioned.  But his true motivation may be overshadowed by the 
results of his cooperation.  Even if he has not truly renounced his actions or the ideology 
supporting them, what is important is that this former JI terrorist is cooperating with 
authorities. Imron could just as easily have refused to cooperate with authorities on any 
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level, despite any inducements, benefits, or threats. The success of this method is still far 
from certain, but is promising.  In addition to notable successes such as Abas and Imron, 
approximately 30 other terrorists are cooperating with the Indonesian government 
(O’Brien, 2007). 
Admittedly, Indonesia’s counter-ideological effort is neither unique in its program 
focus on incarcerated terrorists, nor its efforts at de-radicalizing these terrorists. What 
makes the Indonesian program unique among similar programs is the Indonesian police 
unit known as Detachment 88. This anti-terrorism unit, comprised of deeply religious 
Muslims who pray with the incarcerated terrorists, is used in conjunction with co-opted 
terrorists like Abas and Imron (O’Brien, 2007). Co-opted terrorists like Abas and Imron 
first spend as much as a week with newly arrested terrorists, breaking down their 
ideologies, before the police speak with them (O’Brien, 2007). According to a senior 
Indonesian counter-terrorism official, "When their Islamic argument is already defeated, 
then it is easy for us. Then we enter” (O’Brien, 2007).    
Indonesian’s counter-ideological approach hints at several potential beneficial 
practices for improved FBI source recruitment of al-Qaeda sources.  First, greater use 
could be made of individuals with former terrorist connections like Imron and Abas, who 
carry more credibility with active terrorists, to directly attempt the recruitment of sources 
or to lay the groundwork for the recruitment by FBI agents.  The FBI should extend this 
practice to include not only the use of terrorists in the United States or under U.S. 
government control as recruiters and ice-breakers, but also to the use of terrorists 
cooperating with friendly foreign governments.   
For instance, if an FBI source candidate were traveling to Jakarta, the FBI, in 
cooperation with the CIA and the local intelligence services, could attempt the 
recruitment of that candidate at that location using credible and possibly well-known 
rehabilitated local terrorists like Imron or Abas. These rehabilitated terrorists could be 
involved to varying degrees in the process.  At the less aggressive end of the spectrum, 
the rehabilitated terrorist could mentally soften the resolve of the targeted terrorist before 
the introduction of the recruiting agents.   
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The rehabilitated terrorist could perform limited but valuable assistance by 
speaking to some of the following issues: Introducing and vouching for the integrity of 
the recruiting agent(s) and the sincerity of the government’s offers; advising the target 
that they were being offered a unique opportunity to extract themselves from their 
terrorist activity; addressing the benefits to themselves and their family of cooperating 
with the government; speaking of the guilt he feels for having committed murderous acts 
and the need for the targeted terrorist to withdraw from this activity before it is too late 
for them; or he could work to defeat the logic of the radicalized Islamic arguments 
underlying their cause.  The rehabilitated assistant might even facilitate his own 
introduction and efforts with the source candidate by first sharing a meal with the target 
or praying with him, as is the practice of Detachment 88, as a way to break the ice before 
proceeding with more substantial discussions. It is these rehabilitated terrorists who are 
most likely to be armed with credible answers to the most pressing questions a terrorist, 
who is even remotely contemplating defecting from his group, might have.  They also 
provide an example in the flesh of someone cooperating with the government; this will be 
hard for the source candidate to ignore.   
Anecdotally, the author has seen evidence of clumsy FBI attempts at recruitment 
through a misguided version of this process. The FBI’s mistake is to believe that the use 
of foreign language speaking agents or even agents who are Muslim (who are not 
necessarily adept at recruiting or operating human sources) creates instant or greater 
credibility with the source candidate. But if credibility were derived from either a 
common language or religion, the recruitment of sources in Muslim countries by native 
police and intelligence agents would be a foregone conclusion, which is obviously not the 
case.  As the Indonesian counter-ideological program would suggest, source recruitment 
is more likely if the messenger is first trusted and the ideology underlying the targeted 
individual’s rationale is refuted.  This, in turn, is much more likely to occur with 
individuals who have been within the source candidate’s in-group or who supported a 
similar cause. 
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C. EGYPT—REVISING JIHADIST IDEOLOGIES AND SOWING DISCORD 
The target of Egypt’s counter-ideological program is similar to that of Indonesia 
in its focus on incarcerated, hard-core terrorists.  However, the Egyptian effort is different 
from the Indonesian program in significant ways.  First, although not a stated objective, it 
appears to be focused beyond de-radicalizing individual terrorists.  It is an effort to revise 
entire jihadist ideologies, primarily through co-opted jihadist ideologues and luminaries, 
who are involved in repudiating the very logic of the religious and political 
underpinnings which were once used to justify and inspire murderous acts of terrorism 
and which brought them to personal prominence (O’Brien, 2007).   
Second, either as an intentional objective or fortuitous consequence of its 
approach, the Egyptian effort is reputedly sowing great discord amongst the terrorists and 
their group structure. While the Indonesian program appears to be more concerned with 
the progression of individual de-radicalization and the acquisition of tactical intelligence 
from co-opted terrorists, the Egyptian program is more strategic in its apparent purposes.  
It seeks to destabilize entire groups by sowing ideological dissension. The Egyptian 
government, for instance, participates in this dissension with “the financing of the 
publication of revisionist books written by jihadists in prison” (O’Brien, 2007).   
Cronin (2006) noted that “capturing or killing of the leader,” is one of seven 
broad historic reasons for the demise of terrorist groups in the modern era (this is 
discussed further in the conclusions).  In support of her position, she cited examples 
including the capture of the Shining Path’s leader Guzman and the Real Irish Republican 
Army’s Michael McKevitt, both of whom urged their followers from behind their prison 
bars to cease their activities (Cronin, 2006). The Egyptian effort to use co-opted terrorist 
ideologues to undermine the ideological pillars of the jihadist cause is an intelligent 
variation of one of these seven identified reasons.  As Cronin (2006) would reason, 
Guzman and McKevitt could appeal to their followers to lay down their arms based on 
the rigid organizational structure of their terrorist groups, and, in the case of Guzman or 
Abdullah Ocalan of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), their cult-like followings. But 
with radical Islamic groups like al-Qaeda, the strength behind their jihadist message is 
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not in a rigid organizational structure or cult of personality; al-Qaeda’s strength is in its 
ideology. Therefore, it is the ideology which must be repudiated, not simply the group’s 
leadership. This seems clear when considering possible scenarios following the death of 
Usama Bin Ladin. There will still be jihadists long after he is dead, spawned from the 
thoughts of individuals like Sayid Qutb and others, until their radical ideals are rejected 
as erroneous.    
The Egyptian program’s most notable success is the cooperation of former al-
Qaeda ideologue and Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, more 
commonly known as Dr. Fadl (Wright, 2008). Fadl was so influential within the jihadist 
movement that his teachings were part of the indoctrination program for al-Qaeda recruits 
(Wright, 2008). Reflecting on his own prominence, he is reputed to have said to the Arab 
newspaper Dar al-Hayat that “For years after the launching of Al Qaeda, they would do 
nothing without consulting me” (Wright, 2008).   
The application of the Egyptian counter-ideological approach of using jihadist 
ideologues and luminaries to undercut the very logic of entire groups is clearly a 
complementary process to the possible benefits to source recruitment already suggested 
from the Indonesian counter-ideological approach. Rather than just using former 
terrorists as intermediaries in a recruitment operation, the FBI could also use respected 
rehabilitated imams, theologians, and ideologues in the Egyptian manner.   
But the Egyptian model also suggests another alternative to improved source 
recruitment.  When the FBI can identify formal cells or even less structured groups of 
radical individuals linked by the glue of a common cause or ideology, it might consider 
the Egyptian model of attempting to sow ideological discord amongst these groups before 
ever attempting a recruitment approach. And how would the FBI identify these cells and 
less structured groups with which to ply this Egyptian approach of sowing ideological 
discord?   
The community-based Singaporean model discussed above would be a logical 
choice. Cooperative leaders from the Islamic communities, who are more attuned to 
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subtle indicators of radical Islamic teachings in their own mosques, schools, and homes, 
can identify the imams and youths coalescing into potential harmful groups much faster 
and with more accurately than the FBI can through its own individual efforts. 
Sowing the seeds of ideological discord amongst these groups could be 
orchestrated through very direct measures, as well as more indirectly.  As an example of 
a direct method, reformed ideologues could be invited to the United States by local 
community leaders, quietly supported by the FBI. These ideologues would give speeches 
and lectures at troubled mosques and communities and could leave behind their 
revisionist materials in mosques and Islamic book stores. Through their elevated status as 
former jihadists and prepared in advance with intelligence on the radical ideological 
positions of the groups of concern to the FBI and local Islamic leaders, they would be in 
the best position to refute these beliefs and to provide ideological backing to local, 
supportive imams and leaders.   
Ironically, the suggested use of reformed ideologues to shore-up ideological 
positions and causes is simply a reversal of precisely what radical groups in the United 
States have been doing successfully for years. HAMAS, as an example, through its front 
groups including the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and the Islamic 
Association for Palestine, sponsored well-known HAMAS and Muslim Brotherhood 
leaders to come to the United States for speaking tours (Trahan, 2008). These speakers 
often addressed communities about issues of great concern to their groups, which were 
expertly packaged and communicated in Islamic terms and historical symbols from 
Islam’s past, which supported their radical interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence.  
Through these methods, they were able to mold and influence the positions of Islamic 
communities on various topics, such as why they believed supporting the Oslo Peace 
Accords was wrong.9 Closer to the topic of al-Qaeda, Usama Bin Ladin’s well-known 
mentor, Abduallah Azzam, also came to the United States in the 1980s to drum up 
support for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.10     
                                                 
9 Based on author’s investigation in U.S. v Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. 
10 Video footage of Azzam lecturing in the United States for jihad was also presented at the Holy Land 
Foundation trial.   
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Indirectly, the FBI in-concert with other governments could create “chance” 
encounters between members of a targeted group and reformed ideologues, particularly if 
the U.S.-based terrorists travel overseas.  Controversial materials from these reformed 
jihadist luminaries (such as Imron’s cassette recordings of sermons for use in his family’s 
East Java madrassa) can also be introduced into the group through other means.  Given 
the extensive use of the Internet by jihadist groups, it would not be difficult to send the 
messages of reformed ideologues such as Dr. Fadl to the email accounts of entire groups 
of individuals or jihadist websites in an effort to cause group dissension. These messages 
can be sent as streaming videos containing clear identification of the speaker, possibly in 
a collegial or religious setting, in order to dispel disbelief that the message is fraudulent 
or coerced. Moreover, working in conjunction with foreign governments controlling these 
jihadist luminaries, messages could be crafted to address specific theological issues, 
doubts, or questions which intelligence might indicate are important to a targeted group 
or individual.  Even if these messages are believed to be coerced, they may still create the 
desired affect by initiating discussions on controversial religious or political topics which 
could lead to group splintering or abandonment of the cause by some individuals.  Those 
individuals who do respond to these messages in a positive manner or who even engage 
in further dialogue about the subject would be obvious candidates for further 
investigation as recruitment candidates, possibly using the previously discussed 
Singaporean or Indonesian methods. In short, theological discourse ensuing from the 
planting of revisionist seeds could serve to identify those most individuals most receptive 
to recruitment. 
For its concentration on co-opting ideologues, the Egyptian program is to be 
commended. But, as with the Indonesian approach, it begs the question are these counter-
ideological programs are too narrowly focused on incarcerated terrorists?   
D. SAUDI ARABIA—THE BROAD APPROACH  
Saudi Arabia’s counter-ideological efforts are by far the most ambitious and 
complete efforts examined in this limited review.  This assessment is based in terms of its 
national scope, purpose, and application of varied approaches.  It is certainly a mixed 
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program, incorporating components similar to those from Indonesia and Singapore, but it 
far exceeds these programs with respect to the efforts of the Saudi government to reach 
all residents of the country, not simply individual sympathizers or terrorists, or specific 
groups such as incarcerated terrorists.  According to one ambitious Saudi government 
statement, they are waging “a program to eradicate the roots of terrorism” (Saudi-US 
Relations Information Service, 2005). The Saudi counter-terrorism program is composed 
of three broad areas: Targeting terrorists within the Kingdom for capture or elimination; 
targeting financial support for terrorism with the Kingdom; and targeting the messengers 
of terrorism and the recipients of the message (Saudi-US Relations Information Service, 
2005).   
The third area of this program, targeting the messengers and the recipients, is 
arguably the most important for the purposes of this thesis as it contains activities not 
already employed in the U.S. (Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, 2008). Within 
this third step, the Kingdom’s counter-ideological program can be further broken down 
into several areas of focus worthy of discussion: The Central Security Project; 
Moderating the Imams; and the Al-Sakhinah Project. 
1. The Central Security Project 
The Central Security Project is the centerpiece of the Kingdom’s counter-
ideological program (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008). Whereas 
Indonesia’s program, as well as those of other countries such as Egypt, are focused on 
hard-core terrorists of the ilk of Imron and Abas (individuals who have participated in 
deadly attacks), the Kingdom’s program prohibits these types of terrorists from 
participating; it focuses on terrorist sympathizers (Boucek, 2007). The project appears to 
dismiss violent terrorists as incorrigible.11 Instead, the Kingdom concentrates its 
resources on the marginal supporters whom it believes are yet worth saving—those who 
have not participated in violence (Boucek, 2007). This is a significant departure from 
other national programs, particularly Indonesia’s and Egypt’s. 
                                                 
11 The Saudis’ decision to exclude violent terrorists from their program’s efforts may speak to a belief 
on their part that certain types of terrorists or individuals cannot be reformed.  This point is relevant later in 
this thesis when the issue of Type A and Type B terrorists is discussed.  
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In the United States, what triggers the labeling of an individual as a “terrorist” or 
terrorist sympathizer” is most likely to be a judicial or administrative finding of criminal 
involvement in terrorist activities. The litmus test in Saudi Arabia is primarily 
ideological. Those holding takfiri beliefs, or even caught with takfiri propaganda are 
subject to being labeled as terrorist sympathizers (Boucek, 2007).  
By subscribing to the takfiri position, a Muslim can declare other Muslims or the 
state as impious unbelievers who can be killed.  This is a necessary ideological prop for 
jihadists to “legally” kill other Muslims.  Noted political scientist Gilles Kepel said the 
following about takfir: 
In Islamic doctrine, this is a very serious accusation, called takfir.  The 
term derives from the work kufr (impiety), and it means that one who is, 
or claims to be, a Muslim is declared to be impure…For those who 
interpret Islamic law literally and rigorously, one who is impious to this 
extent can no longer benefit from the protection of law.  According to the 
consecrated expression, ‘his blood is forfeit,’ and he is condemned to 
death. (2002, 31) 
Unlike the Indonesia program which uses co-opted terrorists as its primary tools 
or messengers, the Kingdom’s program is based on intense religious and psychological 
discussions with the terrorist sympathizers.  The organizational structure for this purpose 
is the Advisory Committee, which reports directly to the Ministry of Interior (Boucek, 
2007). The Advisory Committee is comprised of Islamic scholars, academics, 
psychologists, and others.  The thrust of the program clearly lies with the Islamic 
scholars, however, who “re-educate” the sympathizers on Islam and attempt to convince 
them that they were misled into following false and corrupted practices (Boucek, 2007). 
One of the key points of the Kingdom’s program is the belief that “those who have fallen 
prey to jihadist influences are victims” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2007). 
Sympathizers in the Central Security Project are eventually offered an opportunity 
to re-integrate into society if they successfully complete the re-education program, which 
lasts several months.  Reminiscent of elements of U.S. drug treatment programs, these 
sympathizers re-integrate through half-way houses (International Institute for Strategic 
 32
Studies, 2007).  Currently, the Kingdom has space for about 3,000 people in these half-
way houses, but is planning to accommodate 6,700 individuals (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2007). 
A unique aspect of the re-integration of these sympathizers to society is their 
continued monitoring, encompassing clear Saudi cultural aspects; “Participants are 
released into society against guarantees from both their family and tribe, who jointly 
provide an informal round-the-clock surveillance capability…” (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2007). Given the role ascribed by Sageman and others to “Friendship, 
kinship, and discipleship” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135) in jihadist recruitment,  the use of 
family and tribal affiliations in a positive manner to prevent recidivism seems an 
enlightened move (unless the family was originally responsible for introducing the 
sympathizer into the jihadist process).   
The U.S. Department of Defense has recognized the value of courting traditional 
organizational structures, such as tribes, in their fight against the insurgency in Iraq.   
Saudi Arabia’s use of families, clans and tribes to combat recidivism amongst terrorist 
sympathizers should be carefully followed to determine if traditional Arab patterns of 
societal organization are effective in dampening terrorism recruitment.  Similarly, it 
would be interesting to know if there is a positive correlation between terrorism 
recruitment in the U.S. and Western Europe and a breakdown of family, clan, and tribal 
ties in these locations.  As correctly pointed out, the Saudi’s use of family and clans to 
police released sympathizers of the Central Security Project would be difficult to 
replicate in other countries without a similar societal structure, such as the United States.  
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). Nevertheless, this is just one element 
of the Central Security Project.   
2. Moderating the Imams 
The Saudis have attempted to reengineer the ideological message from the 
Kingdom’s ulema “to promote what by Saudi standards are moderate interpretations of 
Islam” (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008). At an official level, there is 
some recognition of the dangers posed by the imams’ backing of violence.  For instance, 
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in 2007, the Saudi Interior Minister publicly stated, “These preachers are more dangerous 
that the terrorists themselves” (Ottaway, 2006). This part of the Saudi program involves 
moderating the official religious establishment of the country, but also of former 
outspoken opponents of the regime, such as Salman al-Ouda and others (Ottaway, 2006). 
It involves the straightforward idea of moderating religious-backed ideas of hate.  For 
instance, the Saudi ulema has issued fatwas prohibiting jihad in Iraq, urging caution with 
money so it does not end-up in the hands of terrorists and stating that suicide bombers are 
“condemned to eternal suffering in Hell” (Glass & Yeoshua, 2008). 
3. The Al-Sakhinah Project 
This project is the Saudi effort to address the vexing binary poison of jihadist 
ideology and the Internet. This aspect of the program is multi-pronged. It involves both a 
public awareness effort about the dangers of jihadist Internet sites and an effort to shut 
down these sites. In support of the latter, the Saudis enacted the “Statute for Fighting 
Information Crime.” This law penalizes “anyone who sets-up terrorist websites and/or 
uses them to communicate with leaders of terrorist organizations, spread terrorist 
ideology, raise funds for terrorist organizations, or disseminate information on 
manufacturing explosives” with a ten year prison sentence and $1.3 million dollar fine 
(Glass & Yeoshua, 2008).    
How effective has the Saudi program been?  To date, it would be fair to describe 
the nascent program as a qualified success.  At least with regards to the Central Security 
Project, the Saudi government claims that only 20 percent of those who pass through the 
program are re-offenders (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008).  Also telling 
is a November 2007 capture in the Kingdom of several terrorist cells which were 
preparing for attacks, including targeting senior Saudi clerics who were speaking out 
against the terrorists (Glass & Yeoshua, 2008).  
Critics of the Saudi program contend that the Central Security Project fails to 
change the attitude of terrorist sympathizers and that it simply uses “a combination of 
pressure and generous financial inducements to persuade individuals to renounce the use 
of violence inside the kingdom, while ensuring they will be unable to export it 
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elsewhere” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008). This criticism may be 
accurate, but if it nevertheless succeeds in removing terrorist sympathizers from 
progressing further down the jihadist radicalization process, it may be acceptable, at least 
as a start.  
With respect to practices from the Saudi counter-ideological program, which have 
potential application in source recruitment, the FBI should consider closely examining 
individuals holding takfiri beliefs. This is not to suggest that FBI investigations be 
predicated strictly upon First Amendment rights.  However, among those individuals who 
are already under investigation or under consideration for source recruitment based upon 
other legitimate investigative predications, those holding takfiri beliefs should be given 
additional consideration. For the Saudis, takfiri beliefs are clearly a marker of pre-
terrorist thinking. The FBI should consider evaluating with Saudi assistance the 
ideological components of takfiri beliefs and its visible identifiers, such as books or 
fatwas written by takfiri proponents or other propaganda, as a way to identify takfiri 
believers in the United States. Takfiri believers would then form a pool from which the 
FBI could concentrate its search for potential sources.  Likewise, the FBI’s understanding 
of the components of this radical belief system would allow it to enhance the credibility 
of existing non-takfiri sources attempting to infiltrate jihadist groups and the 
understanding of agents privy to intercepted conversations amongst individuals who 
might be under consideration for recruitment. The identification of takfiri-practicing 
imams and believers would be a natural task for community leaders under the 
Singaporean model. 
In conclusion, weakening the ideological motivation of individuals who hold 
promise as recruited sources, by such methods as establishing dependency on the 
government, using reformed terrorists or ideologues to refute their own ideologies, and 
using takfiri beliefs as a marker of pre-terrorist thinking, is a logical step to a successful 
recruitment. If, as Sageman argues, social affiliation with the jihad includes “an 




ideology” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135) or as Hassan (2006) argues, motivation is driven by 
ideology, especially for al-Qaeda, then counter-ideological programs need further 
consideration for the lessons they hold in recruiting terrorist sources.   
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IV. THREE COMPELLING PSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS 
ABOUT TERRORISTS 
Even today, a primary reason for Western failure in the War on Terror is 
this same cause: an innate inability to understand the Islamist psyche. 
(Husain, 2007, 153) 
Ed Husain, former Islamist 
What does the extensive body of psychological, sociological, and political science 
studies of terrorism spanning over 40 years suggest for the reasons why some terrorists 
are recruitable as intelligence sources? Much of the work in the field of psychology, 
especially that which was conducted in the 1960-1980’s, was often Eurocentric and 
focused on nationalists and leftists terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction, the Italian 
Red Brigades, or the IRA.  The studies of this period were reflective of the intelligence 
community’s focus on the Soviet/communist threat, not on radical Islamic groups akin to 
al-Qaeda (Victoroff, 2005).   
For both counter-terrorism pundits and practitioners, one must ask if the prior 
Eurocentric focus in the field of psychology on nationalists and leftists terrorist groups 
does not present a potential pitfall of “carryover?” Are the results of studies on 
religiously-inspired groups such as al-Qaeda judged by assessments made from the 
studies and counter-terrorism experiences against terrorist groups which proceeded al-
Qaeda, particularly those that were European and not religiously inspired? (Heider, 
1988). 
Culture is “A particular form of civilization, esp. the beliefs, customs, arts and 
institutions of a society at a given time” (Webster, 2008, p. 104). When al-Qaeda is 
thought of as a culture, in the anthropological sense of the word, or even a sub-set of the 
broader culture of terrorism, it appears inevitable that many of the same potential 
problems which plague ethnographical field studies, what has been termed the 
“Rashomon Effect,” are also present in past and current examinations of al-Qaeda.  As 
Karl Heider wrote in American Anthropologist: 
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Most of us first go to the field at young and impressionable ages and our 
notions of culture (as well as our theories) are often strongly shaped by the 
first cultures we study… It is surely time to think about these matters [the 
Rashomon Effect] systematically. With few exceptions anthropologists 
have lagged behind other scholars, most notably psychologists. (1998, pp. 
73-81) 
If one strips away some of the non-applicable ethnographical aspects of earlier 
terrorism studies and concentrates on the widely-accepted psychological commonalities 
amongst terrorists garnered from these studies in general, this previous body of work still 
retains its applicability to this discussion on recruiting al-Qaeda sources, with less danger 
of carry-over.  What are these terrorists’ commonalities? 
While Jeff Victoroff of the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry at the 
University of Southern California, School of Medicine, warns against looking for a single 
type of “terrorist mind;” the particular psychological findings to be used in this thesis 
appear to be universal to all terrorists, regardless of their motivations, ethnicity, or other 
classifications (2005). An appreciation of these compelling base-line psychological 
findings, devoid of particular terrorism cultures (i.e. group affiliation), are therefore 
assessed to be useful as elemental building blocks, constants, and assumptions in the 
development of a recruitment model targeting al-Qaeda sources.  
The first of the three compelling findings about terrorists for the purposes of this 
paper is that they are not anymore psychologically disturbed or “crazy” than the rest of 
society as a whole (Horgan, 2003). They are neither psychopaths, nor in other ways 
mentally disturbed (Borum, 2004). According to Victoroff (2005), Antisocial Personality 
Disorder (APD) is the term now used in place of sociopathy, which, in turn, replaced the 
term psychopathy. APD is a “pattern of remorseless disregard for the rights of others” 
(Victoroff, 2005, p. 10.) The difference between the insane and a sociopath, according to 
Victoroff, is that “a psychotic or ‘insane’ person is so mentally disordered as to not know 
right from wrong, while a sociopath knows right from wrong and chooses wrong for 




As terrorism expert and forensic psychologist Dr. Randy Borum (2004) noted,  
“In reality, psychopathology has proven to be, at best, only a modest risk factor for 
general violence, and all but irrelevant to understanding terrorism.” Andrew Silke, a 
forensic psychologist who has written extensively about counter-terrorism matters 
similarly remarked, “Many myths surround terrorists and terrorism, but surely one of the 
most widely held is that terrorists are crazed fanatics…Like many myths, this one is easy 
to believe yet is almost always completely untrue” (Silke, 2003, p. 29).  Other “pioneers” 
in the psychology of terrorism, such as Martha Crenshaw, are even more direct on this 
matter.  She noted, “…the idea of terrorism as the product of mental disorder or 
psychopathy has been discredited” (Crenshaw, 1992, p. 30).12 
The second finding, which may simply be the converse of point one, and the most 
profound with respect to recruiting terrorists as intelligence sources, is that terrorist are 
rational actors (Victoroff, 2005).  Rational actors exhibit certain behaviors.  They seek 
preferences and consistency in preferences and how they rank them, for instance.  They 
are also aware of their alternatives and choices, can calculate consequences, and can 
assess the probability of getting their preferences (Tucker, 2007).   
The third finding is that no “terrorist profile” or “terrorist personality” has been 
identified. Some researchers argue more emphatically that a profile does not exist 
(Victoroff, 2005). Looking for a potential terrorist via a profile or personality, therefore, 
is fallacious. Dr. Borum, quoting Andrew Silke, made this point in the following manner: 
Silke warns ‘the belief that profiling can provide an effective defence also 
seriously underestimates the intelligence of terrorist organizations’ (Silke, 
2003). Indeed, sophisticated terrorist groups, such as al Qa’ida, actively 
seek to know the ’type’ of person who will attract suspicion and then scout 
and use operators who defy that preconception. Al-Qa’ida expert, Dr. 
Rohan Gunaratna, has documented that the organization recruits members 
from 74 different countries and among at least 40 different nationalities. If 
the profile is the gatekeeper of who poses a threat, defenders will be 
soundly defeated by a known, but unfamiliar-looking enemy. (2004, p. 37) 
                                                 
12 “Pioneers” is Borum’s description of Crenshaw. 
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How do these three findings support the development of a cognitive process or 
model for development of al-Qaeda sources? At the broadest level, the field of 
psychology has established that terrorists, in general, are approachable as fellow rational 
actors who can logically discern what is in their self-interest and weigh options affecting 
their well-being.  Even those terrorists who may never agree to cooperate with the FBI 
will do so from the perspective of being rational actors. Their choice not to cooperate 
with authorities may ultimately lead to their imprisonment or other negative 
consequences, for instance, but it is a choice not to cooperate they rationally make, as 
opposed to having an inability to weigh their options through some psychosis or lack of 
rationality.  Finally, the field of psychology warns against using the fallacy of a terrorist 
profile as an organizing principle for source recruitment.    
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V. TWO POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS FOR RECRUITING AL-
QAEDA TERRORISTS 
The response to the individual behavior of terrorists may be linked to 
differences between emotional and instrumental aggression:  “emotional 
aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, 
and instrumental aggression more sensitive. (McCauley, 2007, p. 22) 
Psychologist Clark McCauley 
Making distinctions between types of terrorists for counterterrorism purposes and 
not merely academic reasons is already in practice.  The Internal Security Department of 
Singapore, which faces a terrorism threat from the al-Qaeda affiliate Jamah Islamiyah 
distinguishes between terrorists who were involved in operational activities from those 
who were involved in missionary or Dawa work (Hassan & Pereire, 2006).   
In hostage negotiations, typologies used include the “traditional,” “contingent,” or 
“instrumental” terrorists, as opposed to the “absolute” terrorists (Zartman, 2003). The 
traditional terrorists will use hostages to leverage their goals (Zartman, 2003). Violence 
by the traditional terrorists is contingent.  In contrast, the absolute terrorist is one 
“…whose action is non-instrumentalist, a self-contained act that is completed when it has 
occurred and is not a means to obtain some other goal…Suiciders—bombers and 
hijackers—are absolute terrorists, and so are beyond negotiation (Zartman, 2003, p. 2). 
Since the negotiator’s practice of making distinctions among terrorists at the 
individual level is already grounded in practical applications, involving the highest 
stakes, it seems logical to extend the negotiator’s practice to the theory of terrorist source 
recruitment.  In a sense, the search for the “right” type of terrorist to recruit (or not 
recruit) might be thought of as a negotiation for cooperation, as opposed to the relatively 
ephemeral, contingent cooperation encompassed in negotiations linked to terrorism 
crises, such as hostage taking or aircraft hijackings.     
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A. TYPE A AND B TERRORISTS 
One element in the development of a cognitive framework for recruiting terrorist 
sources of intelligence may be found in the work of Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins of the 
RAND Corporation. They suggest that terrorists can be usefully categorized as 
internalists or externalists, or Types A and B (see Figure 1) (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). The 
Type A terrorists “are all driven by the action and passion itself. Even when they clothe 
themselves in ostensible political objectives (as does bin Laden), their appetites for action 
have proven insatiable and they have changed objectives as necessary to continue” (Davis 
& Jenkins, 2002, p. 11). 
Type B terrorists, on the other hand, have “pragmatic world goals” and “will 
cease terrorism when it is no longer needed” (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11).   Type B 
terrorists have succeeded in transitioning from “terrorist” to civilian leaders (Davis & 
Jenkins, 2002).  Type B terrorists “may be equally ruthless and destructive, but they will 
fade into the ‘normal world’ when they have achieved their aims” (Davis & Jenkins, 
2002). 
 
Figure 1.   Davis and Jenkin’s Type A and Type B Terrorists (2002, p. 11) 
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Davis and Jenkins (2002) claim al-Qaeda is a group or network composed more 
of Type A terrorists than Type Bs. This can be represented in the form of a Venn 
diagram, with a larger circle for the Type A terrorists within the al-Qaeda box, as in 
Figure 2.  Expressed another way, the number of “internalists” with “insatiable” goals is 
larger than those connected to the group with “pragmatic world goals.”  However, as 
noted earlier, this should not be seen as a judgment on the rationality of either the Type A 
or Type Bs.  As discussed, terrorists in general, and therefore both Types A and B, are 
rational actors.   
Significantly, for the development of a cognitive recruitment process for al-Qaeda 
terrorists, “The al-Qaeda system (among others) includes both types, even if al-Qaeda 
itself is clearly Type A” (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11).  If one were to depict al-Qaeda 
in a simple Venn diagram as a representation of Type A and Type B members, it might 
look like the following:  
 
Figure 2.   Al-Qaeda is comprised of both Type A & B terrorists 
B. EMOTIONAL AND INSTRUMENTAL AGGRESSION 
But if psychological studies support the position that all terrorists, in general, are 
rational actors, and Davis and Jenkins’ theory also suggests that both Types A and B 
Al-Qaeda 
Type B al-Qaeda 
       terrorists 
Type A al-Qaeda 
      terrorists 
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terrorists are rational, and that al-Qaeda is comprised of both sets, how does this apparent 
equality of rationality among terrorists assist in the progression of a source recruitment 
model?  What insight, if any, does this provide to an FBI agent attempting to secure the 
cooperation of a terrorist knowing that there are two types of terrorists and that all 
terrorists, in general, are rational?   
The work of Davis and Jenkins is supported by work on the two forms of 
aggression recognized in the field of psychology, these being emotional and instrumental 
aggression (McCauley, 2007, p. 8). As Clark McCauley notes, “Emotional aggression is 
associated with anger and does not calculate long-term consequences. The reward of 
emotional aggression is hurting someone who has hurt you. Instrumental aggression is 
more calculating—it involves the use of aggression as a means to other ends” (2007, p. 
8).   
Of course, it is not necessary that the “hurt” experienced in emotional aggression 
be personal or even physical. This hurt may also be related to perceived insults or 
frustration. Dr. Fathali Moghaddam supports this point. He wrote the following: 
Osama bin Laden was a millionaire when he masterminded the tragedy of 
September 11…captured members of Al-Qaeda have tended not to be 
from the lower economic and educational backgrounds.  Indeed, Al Qaeda 
sympathizers and activist are often from “surprisingly” high economic and 
educational backgrounds.  These facts highlight an important point: 
terrorism is explained by perceptions of deprivation, by feelings of being 
treated unfairly, by a subjective sense of injustice, rather than by objective 
conditions, including poverty and low education. (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 
46) 
Reformed Islamist Ed Husain, who participated in three separate anti-Western 
Islamist organizations in the United Kingdom, independently recognized Dr. 
Moghaddam’s point about the subjective sense of injustice versus objective conditions as 
a basis for terrorism.  Among Husain’s terrorists associations was Asif Hanif, a British 
Muslim who died as Britain’s first suicide bomber in a Tel Aviv bar in April 2003 
(Husain, 2007, pp. 262-263). As Husain noted, Asif Hanif emerged from a middle-class 
background in the United Kingdom, not from “an unemployed, disenchanted inner-city 
Muslim community” (2007, p. 264).    
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Furthermore, perceived injustices cannot be necessarily redressed by improving 
material conditions as these injustices are relative to perceptions to how one or one’s 
group is doing in comparison to others (Moghaddam, 2006).  This may be one 
explanation for understanding why recruitment approaches based largely on the offering 
of money in exchange for cooperation are not a panacea to recruitment attempts.    
Key to understanding the anger of terrorists is that this anger is perceived through 
the group’s interests, not necessarily on an individual level (McCauley, 2007).  As 
McCauley noted, “Group identification makes sense of sacrifice by people who are not 
personally frustrated or insulted. The mistake is to imagine that self-sacrifice must come 
from personal problems, rather than identification with group problems” (McCauley, 
2007, p. 17).      
Returning then to Davis and Jenkins’ work and applying McCauley’s thoughts on 
the two forms of aggression, it is not difficult to now see that of the two terrorist types,  
the Type B terrorists expresses instrumental aggression, which involves the use of 
violence as a “means to other ends.”  When these “other ends” are met, the purpose for 
continuing terrorism ceases.  The Type A terrorists, on the other hand, are clearly fed by 
emotional anger, which may never be satiated sufficiently to make them cease their 
activities.  There is no “ends” for the Type A terrorists. 
Significantly for this thesis, McCauley suggests that the response to the individual 
behavior of terrorists may be linked to differences between emotional and instrumental 
aggression:  “emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and 
punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive” [bold and italics added] 
(2007, p. 22). In consequence, Type B terrorists, those influenced by instrumental 
aggression, should be more approachable to cooperation with the FBI by the types of 
objective rewards and punishments FBI agents might logically offer during a recruitment 
attempt.  In contrast, the Type A terrorists, with their emotional aggression, should be 
less sensitive to the positive rewards of cooperating with the FBI or the negative 
consequences of not cooperating with the FBI.     
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One proposition in answering “who” should be targeted as an intelligence source 
thus lies in identifying the Type B terrorists, who although may operate within the 
context of a Type A organization, such as al-Qaeda, nevertheless approaches the use of 
violence on an instrumental basis. As Type B terrosits approach to violence through 
instrumental aggression, their aggression is in support of achieving practical ends which 
can be relinquished when their ends are met.   
In contrast, the Type A terrorists will include individuals who, through the lens of 
emotional aggression, hold on dogmatically to insatiable goals.  They use or support the 
use of violence, which is probably exaggerated and incongruent with their stated 
objectives, and whose overriding need is retaliation for perceived injustices to their in-
group.  If Type As are “driven by action,” and emotional aggression, then the rational 
option for a Type A terrorist, when confronted between the choices of cooperating as a 
source for the FBI or facing negative consequences such as prison (or even positive 
incentives), will likely be an unwillingness to cooperate, regardless of the long-term 
consequences. As one study which reviewed Singapore’s terrorist reform program noted, 
“It could almost be impossible to persuade any hardcore members of terrorist groups to 
give up their ideology” (Hassan & Pereire, 2006, p. 466). Arguably, what are described 
as “hardcore” terrorists in this statement might now be better understood as Type A 
terrorists, who are led by their emotional aggression.    
Conversely, Saudi Arabia’s reported success with aspects of its counter-
ideological program to rehabilitate takfiri sympathizers who did not yet commit violence 
may be partially explained by understanding these individuals as Type Bs.  Although a 
careful study of this matter is required, it may be that the Saudi Arabian program, 
accidentally or otherwise, identified through the takfiri ideological fault-line its society’s 
Type Bs.  In turn, these believers of takfir, as products of instrumental and not emotional 
aggression, have responded better to the Saudi counter-ideological program’s rewards 
and punishments to exit from the path of terrorism.  In the end, Type A terrorists, 
although rational, should not respond as well as their Type B counter-parts to the 
influence of rewards and punishments, which are a pillar of source recruitment.    
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Returning to the negotiator’s terrorist typology, one glimpses the Type A terrorist 
as that individual with “absolute” and “impossible demands,” which are “immediate, 
unconditional and universal,” is “not willing to enter into political discourse” and which 
make “direct negotiations infeasible” (Hayes, Kaminski, & Beres, 2003, pp. 9-15).  
Therefore, with one exception to be discussed later, individuals assessed to be Type A 
terrorists are less suitable as source recruitment candidates because their goals are 
unlikely to be satisfied by the recruiter and they are less likely to be influenced by 
“objective rewards and punishments.” 
According to Davis and Jenkins, “Type A terrorists, by and large, must be 
eradicated” (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 12).  On the other hand, if the aims or elements of 
the aims of Type B al-Qaeda terrorists are addressed, then it should be possible to reason 
and negotiate with them.  This naturally suggests that any principle for the recruitment of 
al-Qaeda terrorists should be structured against targeting the more pragmatic Type B who 
uses or supports violence as an instrument or a means to an end and who are more likely 
to respond to the types of positive and negative incentives which FBI agents might apply 
during the recruitment process.  
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VI. THREE CATEGORIES OF TYPE B TERRORISTS 
Defining terrorists as Type A or Type B is a good starting point for an organizing 
principle to broadly assess an individual’s recruitment potential.  It is encompassing 
enough to accommodate the heterogeneous nature of terrorists, not established on ethnic 
or cultural factors (which are broad when speaking of al-Qaeda), yet simple enough to be 
applicable by FBI agents in the field. As Victoroff noted, “Terrorists are psychologically 
extremely heterogeneous. Whatever his stated goals and group of identity, every terrorist, 
like every person, is motivated by his own complex of psychosocial experiences and 
traits (2005, p. 35). Defining terrorists as Type As or Type Bs also comports with the 
results in the field of psychology regarding the general rationality of terrorists, the two 
types of recognized aggression, and it avoids the fallacy of the terrorist profile.    
But, is the placement of al-Qaeda terrorists in these two categories actually too 
narrowly defined to capture all the terrorists connected within this complex group and 
movement?  Is it accurate to suggest that al-Qaeda terrorists are immutably either strictly 
Type A or Type B sets, or can these terrorists migrate from one type to the other? This 
author would suggest that there are three categories of Type B al-Qaeda terrorists. 
A. CATEGORY 1: SOLIDLY TYPE B 
This category represents a terrorist as previously described by Davis and Jenkins 
who exhibits Type B characteristics, is influenced by instrumental aggression, and is 
neither migrating into or out of this category. The solidly Type B terrorist has occupied 
this category for some time and is stable. 
B. CATEGORY 2: “PROCESSING” FROM TYPE B TO TYPE A 
This category represents the Type B terrorist who is migrating to Type A status.  
An example of this transition might be contained in the life of Paul Hall. In 1997, former 
United Parcel Service (UPS) employee Paul Hall converted to Islam and adopted the 
name Hassan Abu-Jihad (Holestege, 2008). He was by the accounts of his associates, an 
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average man (Holestege, 2008). In 2007, Hassan Abu-Jihad was convicted on terrorism 
and espionage charges related to passing classified information in 2001 to individuals 
linked to al-Qaeda while serving as a signalman in the U.S. Navy (Holestege, 2008).  
Prior to 1997, it seems inconceivable that Abu-Jihad/Hall would be located anywhere 
within the al-Qaeda box described in Figure 1. By 2001, Hall was arguably somewhere 
within either the Type B or Type A sets if he is judged simply by his actions of passing 
classified information to al-Qaeda.  
Substantial evidence suggests that becoming a terrorist is a process. As Marc 
Sageman concluded, the “recruitment” of terrorists into a movement is a social process, 
“accomplished through friendship, kinship, and discipleship” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135).  
Sageman provides examples of this process, including Ahmad Ressam and the Hamburg 
Cell of the 9/11 terrorists, detailing their lives before they were terrorists. These examples 
make a strong case from their processing from Type B to Type A. 
The New York City Police Department, in its analysis of five terrorism cases 
within the United States, also concluded that “the potential terrorist or group of terrorists 
begin and progress through a process of radicalization” (Silber & Arvin, 2007, p. 5). In 
its study, the radicalization process involves four steps: Pre-radicalization, self-
identification, indoctrination and jihadization (Silber & Arvin, 2007).  This New York 
City Police Department study also concluded that “All individuals who begin this process 
do not necessarily pass through all the stages and many, in fact, stop or abandon this 
process at different points” (Silber & Arvin, 2007, p. 19). Their study represented this 
process in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.   NYPD’s Four-Step Radicalization Process (Silber & Arvin, 2007, p. 5). 
The works of the New York City Police Department and Sageman would 
therefore support what otherwise seems logical—Type A terrorists are not born or made 
overnight.  They come to exist over time, through a radicalization process.  If this is the 
case, then it would seem logical to assume there is generally a stage at which individuals 
are Type B before becoming Type A.  Applying it to the earlier Venn diagrams, the result 
is Figure 4.    
 












Aspects of the Saudi Arabia counter-ideological program discussed earlier might 
also be examined as potential evidence supporting the argument that individuals can 
process from Type B to Type A terrorists, as well as from Type B status out of terrorism 
completely. In particular, the author would posit that the Kingdom’s concentration to 
rehabilitate takfiri sympathizers and its program’s exclusion of hardened terrorists (those 
who have committed acts of violence) incorporates logic similar to that supporting the 
work of Davis and Jenkins. The takfiri sympathizers would represent the Type B who 
must be “suppressed” and offered “inducements” (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11).13  
These “inducements,” such as Saudi financial support, are used to encourage them to 
forego the path of terrorism with the larger goal that they be re-integrated into society.  
When successful, this essentially removes these former Type B terrorist sympathizers 
from the al-Qaeda box surrounding the Venn diagram in Figure 1. Those individuals who 
have blood on their hands, which the Saudis exclude from their efforts to re-integrate into 
society, are the Type A terrorists who must be “eradicated, deflected or isolated.” (Davis 
& Jenkins, 2002, p. 11). The fact that the Saudi counter-ideological program exercises its 
efforts and resources on these takfiri sympathizers speaks to an underlying belief that 
these individuals can be ideologically prevented from moving further down the path of 
terrorism, or what has been described as migrating from Type B to Type A status.  
C. CATEGORY 3: MIGRATING FROM TYPE A TO TYPE B 
The defections of violent al-Qaeda terrorists around the world into cooperative 
arrangements with their host governments also suggest that there are migrations of Type 
A terrorists into Type B. The case of Jemaah Islamiah terrorist Ali Imron is instructive on 
this point (O’Brien, 2007).  Although experts can debate whether the JI is formally a part 
of al-Qaeda or its own actor, the links between JI and al-Qaeda are extensive and well 
within the boundaries previously established in this paper for what constitutes an al-
Qaeda terrorist.  
                                                 
13 For purposes of clarity, suppressing and inducing Type Bs are Davis and Jenkin’s conclusions; they 
did not address takfiri sympathizers.  
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On October 12, 2002, JI’s bombings at two nightclubs and in front of the U.S. 
Consulate on the island of Bali killed 202 people and wounded another 209 (Australian 
Federal Police, 2002). For Australians, who took the brunt of the casualties, the 
devastation of the Bali Bombings has been referred to as their 9/1 (Australian Federal 
Police, 2002). Given Imron’s key role in these horrific attacks, it would be difficult to 
image a higher level of knowledge and direct involvement in an attack than Imron’s 
activities in this instance, short of serving as a suicide-bomber.  
Using the definitions of Davis and Jenkins to describe a Type A terrorist, Imron 
could be placed within this set at the time of the attacks as an example of one of the “self 
driven seekers of action, causes, or religious commitment” (2002, p. 11). It would be 
difficult to think otherwise how an individual who directly participated in such a 
murderous attack could be interpreted as a terrorist who didn’t need to be “eradicated” 
(Davis & Jenkins, 2002). Years later, he is now reportedly cooperating with Indonesian 
authorities from his prison cell to prevent future JI attacks (O’Brien, 2007). As an 
individual who fit easily into the Type A category at one point, he is now admittedly 
constantly attempting to persuade others to forgo the option of terrorism and “will never 
stop asking for forgiveness” from his victims and their families (O’Brien, 2007). It is now 
difficult to see how he is not classified as a Type B terrorist, if not somewhere even 
outside of the Type B set entirely.  It appears with Imron that this arguably former Type 
A al-Qaeda terrorist is cooperating with authorities and is exhibiting Type B pragmatic 
behavior which reflects prioritization of his own self-interests above his former group’s 
interests and which has led to cooperation with the authorities.  Imron could just as easily 
have refused to cooperate with authorities at any level, despite any inducements, benefits 
or threats.  At some point in time and for reasons which can only be guessed at without 
more details, Imron’s pragmatic view of his situation made him migrate from the Type A 
set to or through the Type B set, as reflected in Figure 2. 
A similar story occurs with former top JI commander, Nasir Abas (O’Brien, 
2007). Abas is a former JI cell leader with authority over parts of northern Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines (O’Brien, 2007). He was also employed with JI as the 
commander of its Hudaibiyah training camp, where he trained hundreds of fellow 
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terrorists (O’Brien, 2007). Nasir Abas is a weapons specialist and is the brother-in-law of 
Mukhlas Abas, the alleged mastermind of the October 2002 Bali bombings (O’Brien, 
2007). Nasir Abas’ sensitive organizational positions and immediate familial ties to 
another violent, top terrorist would provide exceptional intelligence on JI’s membership 
and activities and might be interpreted as a sign that he is a Type A al-Qaeda terrorist. 
Unlike Imron, however, Nasir Abas was arrested only on a minor immigration infraction 
and spent just 10 months in prison (O’Brien, 2007). This is hardly the type of lengthy 
imprisonment Imron received or what one would expect would be conducive for 
cooperation of an individual with such impeccable terrorist credentials. Yet, like Imron 
he is assisting authorities in de-radicalization of members of his former terrorist group 
(O’Brien, 2007).  
U.S. terrorism expert, Zachary Abuza, who is following the radicalization of JI 
members in Indonesia, noted that of the more than 300 JI terrorist arrested, 50 members 
or approximately 17 percent come from the JI’s leadership. Of the 50 or so terrorists 
captured from the JI leadership, approximately 30 individuals (60 percent) have been 
rehabilitated (O’Brien, 2007). A key to this remarkable turnaround is the authorities’ use 
of Nasir Abas to first speak with detained terrorists before they are interrogated by the 
police (O’Brien, 2007). 
Is this migration of perceived Type A terrorist to Type B, as exemplified with the 
JI terrorists, replicable outside of the JI example? The answer appears to be yes.  Omar 
Ashour, a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at McGill University in Canada, 
observed that “The phenomenon of ‘de-radicalization’ is not only confined to Egyptian 
militants. It has also been undertaken by Algerian, Saudi, Yemeni, Jordanian, Tajik, 
Malaysian, and Indonesian armed Islamist movements, factions and individuals” 
(Ashour, 2008, p. 1). 
What this information suggests is that becoming a Type A terrorist is not an 
irreversible process for all Type As. An individual once in this category, can still become 
more pragmatic and migrate back to the Type B set, where he is presumably more likely 
to be successfully recruited. This important shift must be accompanied by a shift in 
aggression from emotional to instrumental. This migration from Type A back to Type B 
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can be reflected in the Venn diagram of Figure 5. This information also suggests that if a 
Type A terrorist must be the target of a source recruitment, a counter-ideological effort 
tailored against that individual aiming to destabilize his ideological motivation and lessen 
his emotional aggression should be conducted prior to the recruitment approach.    
 
Figure 5.   Migrating from Type A to Type B 
Returning now to Davis and Jenkins’ work as a possible organizing principle for 
initially assessing an individual’s recruitment potential, one sees that any cognitive 
process or model for the recruitment of al-Qaeda terrorists should encompass several 
categories of Type B individuals.   
In Category 1, the focus is on recruitment of those individuals assessed to fall 
solidly within the Type B set. Individuals in this set may have been involved with al-
Qaeda for years, but are unlikely to migrate to becoming Type A terrorists.  In Category 2 
(Figure 4), there are those individuals who should be considered for recruitment who are 
still within the Type B set, but who may be in danger of moving towards the Type A set 
if the radicalization process discussed by Sageman and the New York Police Department 
study is allowed to continue. This process may lead to Type A terrorists if the process is 
neither internally rejected, abandoned, nor externally disrupted. Approaching these 
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circuiting completion of this process. And finally, in Category 3 (Figure 5), a focus on 
recruitment should include those individuals who were at some point (possibly 
incorrectly), assessed to be Type A terrorists, such as Ali Imron, Nasir Abas, and Dr. 
Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, but who are migrating back to the Type B set.  All three 
categories of Type B terrorists are represented in Figure 6. 
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VII. ONE EXPLANATION FOR RECRUITMENT FAILURES OF 
THE RIGHT TERRORISTS: CORRESPONDENT INFERENCE 
THEORY 
The findings of several decades of psychological studies speak of terrorists as 
rational actors.  But how does this compare with what is known about these terrorists 
from their behavior, specifically their violent attacks, which often appear so devoid of 
rational thinking?  How, after all, is beheading an individual the action of a rational 
actor? Mark Lilla summed-up this apparent contradiction in his September 2007 editorial 
to The New York Times.  He wrote: 
Islamists, even if they are learned professionals, appear to us primarily as 
frustrated, irrational representatives of frustrated, irrational societies, 
nothing more…The case of contemporary Islam is on everyone’s mind, 
yet is so suffused with anger and ignorance as to be paralyzing.  All we 
hear are alien sounds, motivating unspeakable acts. (Lilla, 2007)14 
Insight on the anecdotal disparity between the psychological studies supporting 
the rationality of terrorists and their irrational actions may be found in an appreciation of 
Correspondent Inference Theory (CIP).   
Doctoral candidate Max Abrahm’s article, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” 
discussed how Correspondent Inference Theory “explains the cognitive process by which 
an observer infers the motives of an actor” (2006, pp. 57-58). According to Abrahm, 
(2006) CIP was developed by social psychologist Edward Jones who, in turn, built upon 
the work of the father of attributional theory, Fritz Heider:  
Heider saw individuals as “naïve psychologists” motivated by a practical 
concern: a need to simplify, comprehend, and predict the motives of 
others. Heider postulated that individuals process information by applying 
inferential rules that shape their response to behavior. In laboratory 
experiments, he found that people attribute the behavior of others to 
inherent characteristics of their personality—or dispositions—rather than 
to external or situational factors. Correspondent inference theory 
attempted to resolve a crucial question that Heider left unanswered: How 
does an observer infer the motives of an actor based on its behavior? Jones 
                                                 
14 Mark Lilla is a professor of humanities at Columbia University. 
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showed that observers tend to interpret an actor’s objective in terms of the 
consequence of the action [underscore added]. He offered the following 
simple example to illustrate the observer’s assumption of similarity 
between the effect and objective of an actor: a boy notices his mother 
close the door, and the room becomes less noisy; the correspondent 
inference is that she wanted quiet. The essential point is what Jones called 
the “attribute-effect linkage,” whereby the objectives of the actor are 
presumed to be encoded in the outcome of the behavior. Levels of 
correspondence describe the extent to which the objectives of the actor are 
believed to be reflected in the effects of the action.  When an action has 
high correspondence, the observer infers the objectives of the actor 
directly from the consequences of the action. With low correspondence, 
the observer either does not perceive the behavior as intentional or 
attributes it to external factors, rather than to the actor’s disposition. 
(Abrams, 2006, p. 58) 
CIP explains several factors which may negatively impact al-Qaeda source 
recruitment, even when the right Type B terrorist is available and targeted. First, CIP may 
interfere with the acceptance of recruitment as a viable option amongst a range of 
counter-terrorism options.  Expressed another way, CIP provides a rationale for the 
reluctance and doubts some FBI agents, FBI non-agent personnel making policy 
decisions, prosecutors, and other policy makers have regarding the practicality of 
attempting to recruit an individual known as an al-Qaeda member or suspected group 
associate.  If an individual is assessed by the effects of their actions to be a zealot, radical, 
or beyond the reach of reasoning, the option for attempting to recruit that individual is 
less attractive than other options, such as his arrest and incarceration, which might be 
regarded as a form of “eradication.”    
Second, CIP provides an understanding for the cognitive difficulties in discerning 
the differences between Type A and B terrorists, which is significant when considering 
that the three categories of Type B terrorists form the best recruitment pool.  As an 
example, if al-Qaeda, “the group,” is responsible for horrendous attacks on civilians and 
grizzly acts of barbarity such as beheadings, arguably acts of high correspondence, then 
the perception to counter-terrorism professionals of the consequences of these actions 
may be that anyone involved with this group, even if they did not participate in these acts, 
must subscribe to this behavior.   
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Conversely, CIP might also provide an understanding for how potential al-Qaeda 
sources, even Type B, might incorrectly interpret the actions of a recruiting FBI agent as 
threatening and designed to incarcerate them or worse.  This may limit their ability to see 
their own cooperation as a real possibility. Whether CIP affects the perceptions of the 
agent or source candidate to correctly assess the rationality or intentions of the other 
player, it is an impediment to successful source recruitment.  
Although al-Qaeda is comprised of both Type A and B, a review of media sources 
will confirm that it is the “group” which receives the credit for a terrorist act taken or 
claimed in its name.  Even when attacks are more closely ascribed to individual actors 
within the group, like Usama Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, those individuals had, arguably, already become icons of the group.  
And, although the group may not sanction the particular attacks or actions of 
subordinates, and when elements or individuals within the group might disagree with an 
attack, these distinctions are generally transparent to the public.  It is “al-Qaeda” which is 
responsible for a barbarous attack.  For instance, seized documentation in Iraq discussed 
how al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri recognized that al-Qaeda in Iraq’s beheadings were 
negatively affecting their reputation with the indigenous Iraqi Sunnis, presumably their 
largest pool of potential supporters (Shapiro, 2008). As “al-Qaeda” is known to be 
responsible for particularly “spectacular,” cruel and wanton attacks, which often appear 
to be irrational outside of the calculus of committing mass murder of non-combatants, 
CIP provides an explanation for why observers, including those involved in recruiting 
sources, infer that the “group’s” attacks or actions reflect the intentions and beliefs of its 
individual members. Even for agents accustomed to working counter-terrorism matters, it 
is hard not to infer that an individual al-Qaeda member’s objectives are not supportive of 
the “group’s” actions to destroy Western civilization, particularly when al-Qaeda’s 
actions are memorialized in powerful images such as commercial aircraft being flown 
into skyscrapers. Victoroff made a similar, albeit non-CIP argument, for one reason why 
studying terrorism is difficult: “in both the scholarly and counterterrorism realms, one 
must acknowledge the possibility that terrorism excites passions that erode logical 
discourse, leading to responses that are reactive and enraged rather than proactive and 
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analytical (Zulaika and Douglass 1996)” (Victoroff, 2005, p. 33). When FBI agents and 
others investigate suspected “al-Qaeda” members, these members are seen as a cohesive 
part of the group whose leaders called upon Muslims in the name of Allah to “kill the 
Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it” (Laquer, 2004, 
p. 412). They are certainly not seen as individual actors, some of whom are more pliable 
Type Bs with instrumental aggression.  
The terrorists, on the other hand, do not see their behavior as irrational, immoral, 
or anti-social. Jeff Victoroff believes that it is plausible that terrorists view themselves in 
a very positive light, “believing themselves to be serving society and judged by their in-
group to be acting in its interest” (2005, p. 14). 
The problem with lumping terrorists together as noted by Princeton’s Shapiro, is 
that “members of terrorist groups…often disagree on what the cause is, and rarely see 
eye-to-eye on the best tactics to achieve their strategic end” (Shapiro, 2008, p. 10) This is 
true even within al-Qaeda, where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi gained the moniker al Gharib 
(the stranger) for his “extreme views,” as well as a letter rebuking his strategy by Ayman 
Al-Zawahiri (Reidel, 2007). 
CIP theory suggests that FBI agents working recruitments of al-Qaeda sources 
must, therefore, consciously work to make the distinctions which the public, including 
the media, does not. They must attempt to discern a potential al-Qaeda source’s 
objectives by his individual behavior and not infer the individual’s objectives through the 
behavior of the collective al-Qaeda group.   
Jeff Viktoroff essentially concluded the same thing. He said:  
While behavioral scientists may recognize marked psychological 
heterogeneity and even prosocial features of terrorists that might be 
exploited in the development of policy, counterterrorism forces and even 
policy makers may resist such conclusions due to cultural bias, cognitive 
inflexibility, or attribution error. (Victoroff, 2005, p. 35) 
It is an agent’s sensitivity to detecting when a disagreement or strain that might 
exist between the prospective recruitment candidate and his affiliated group which is one 
suggested method to identify Type A terrosits possibly migrating to Type B categories.    
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Referring again to CIP, what the potential recruitment candidate might infer from 
the approach of an FBI agent is what he knows of the “FBI’s” involvement in arresting 
and prosecuting terrorists. Or, worse yet, his experience with “law enforcement” may be 
shaped with direct or personal brutal encounters with other police and intelligence 
services or with indirect experiences of such encounters by others within his in-group.  
In other words, just as agents may mistakenly infer that a potential source’s ability 
to be recruited is unlikely because of his association with a group which commits such 
horrendous attacks, the recruitment candidate is just as likely to incorrectly attribute an 
agent’s interest in him through the image of the “FBI’s” collective behavior of arresting 
and prosecuting criminals, or group perceptions such as perceived unjust arrests of 
Muslims. These perceptions on the part of the prospective source can be a serious 
hindrance to the recruiting agent’s establishment of trust with the source candidate.   
The difficulty in establishing trust between a recruiter and a source candidate as 
explained by Correspondent Inference Theory, therefore, can be tied to the need for 
several earlier recommendations for source recruitment. First, recruitment efforts should 
be concentrated on Type B candidates who are more likely to be influenced by positive 
and negative inducements. Second, agents might consider using a trusted intermediary in 
some capacity to facilitate the recruiting agent’s introduction or offer. This intermediary 
could be someone recognized by the source candidate as being affiliated with the in-
group, such as a jihadist luminary or ideologue, whose motives or objectives are less 
likely to be inferred incorrectly by the source candidate. Third, agents should consider 
attempting to soften the ideological resolve of the source candidate before ever 
attempting to make contact. This can be accomplished by sowing the seeds of ideological 
dissension with the introduction of materials produced by former respected ideologues 
and terrorists which confront his ideology and motivation.  And fourth, if possible, the 
agent conducting the recruitment may consider attempting to have several instances of 
incidental contact over an extended period of time with the source candidate wherein no 
negative action ensues, as a way to dispel or soften perceptions that the agent’s motives 
are inherently harmful.  This incidental contact could occur in neutral locations such as 
schools, grocery stores, or even the subject’s business. 
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Oddly enough, it appears the avoidance of CIP must be accomplished through 
acceptance of a contradiction. Avoiding the pitfalls of CIP and identifying the potential 
Type B individuals within a Type A organization requires focus on individual behavior 
and not group behavior in order to infer individual motives.  In short, a source 
candidate’s individual behavior should suggest his classification as a Type A or B 
terrorist. Yet, as noted earlier by McCauley and Moghadam and the observation of 
Husain, it is group identification and subjective perceptions of frustration of how one’s 
group does relative to others, not necessarily personal issues, which helps explain the 
weak causality between those joining terrorist groups and low socio-economic 
conditions.    
To summarize this section, in order for terrorists to be judged properly as Type A 
or B’s their assessment must be based on the consequences of their individual behaviors, 
not by the consequences of their group’s actions. But the frustration of terrorists, their 
perceptions of injustices which must be righted or revenged, must be understood at the 
group level and not necessarily at the individual level.  
Clausewitz famously wrote of the friction or fog of war, “This tremendous 
friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in 
contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured…One, for 
example, is the weather. Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time[italics 
added]…” (As cited in Paret, 1986, pp. 22-203)  In the effort to recruit al-Qaeda sources, 
CIP may be the fog.   
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VIII. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN TYPE A AND B 
TERRORISTS 
Murphy (2004)…emphasizes that an important vulnerability of terrorists is 
not the technical wizardry of intelligence services but rather that fact that 
terrorists always depend on others—other members of their group, 
members of allied groups, the societies in which they live and operate, 
family, friends, acquaintances—and are therefore open to attack via the 
social networks that sustain them. (Bongar, 2007, p. 8) 
Psychologist Bruce Bongar 
Recapping key points of this paper to this point, the work of Davis and Jenkins 
led them to conclude that al-Qaeda is comprised of both the action-oriented Type A and 
the more pragmatic Type B terrorists. Studies in the field of psychology have also led to 
the generally accepted principles that terrorists are, as a whole, not crazed madmen but 
rather rational actors.  Furthermore, no terrorist profile exists.  As rational actors, 
terrorists are capable of making decisions calculated to be in their best interests.  This is a 
necessary and important faculty when a terrorist is placed in the position of selecting 
among contrasting positive and negative consequences stemming from an FBI 
recruitment approach.  The Type B, however, is more likely to employ terrorism as a 
“means to an end” which can be discarded when appropriate; their aggression is 
instrumental or intended to bring about a specific end. When these ends are met, the 
purpose for continuing terrorism ceases.   
The action-oriented Type A terrorists are less likely to compromise as their goals 
are “insatiable,” or possibly simply an excuse for actions motivated by other factors, 
which are fed by emotional aggression.  There is no “ends” for the dedicated Type A 
terrorists.  The Type A terrorist who does not slip into the Type B set will continue his 
path until he is either jailed or killed.  The Type Bs are divided into three sets:  1) The 
solidly Type B; 2) Those individuals advancing along the jihadi-radicalization process 
from Type B to Type A and; 3) The Type A who is slipping or slipped into the Type B 
set.    
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Psychologist Clark McCauley suggests that the response to the individual 
behavior of terrorists may be linked to differences between emotional and instrumental 
aggression: “emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and 
punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive” (McCauley, 2007, p. 22).  In 
consequence, Type B terrorists, those influenced by instrumental aggression, should be 
more approachable to the idea of cooperation with the FBI via their sensitivity to 
objective rewards and punishments. Of both Type A and Type B terrorists, it is the Type 
B which is the best candidate for source recruitment. 
Accounting for the possible confusion described in Correspondent Inference 
Theory (CIP), in which the source candidate may incorrectly infer the recruitment 
attempt by the behaviors of the FBI as a trap to arrest them or worse, the Type B terrorist 
should be more influenced than their Type A counter-parts to the objective rewards and 
punishments of cooperation as an intelligence source. But, as Dr. Fathali Moghaddam 
warns, these objective rewards offered as inducements for cooperation, even to Type B 
terrorists, cannot always be comprised of financial or material offerings: “terrorism is 
explained by perceptions of deprivation, by feelings of being treated unfairly, by a 
subjective sense of injustice, rather than by objective conditions, including poverty and 
low education” (2006, p. 46). McCauley (2007) touches on a related point  when he 
counsels that perceived injustices cannot be redressed necessarily by improving material 
conditions as these injustices are relative to perceptions to how one or one’s group is 
doing in comparison to others.  In consequence, it is not only important to select a Type 
B terrorist as the recruitment candidate, but also to offer objective rewards and 
punishments which address (as much as possible), the subject’s perceptions, feelings and 
“subjective sense of injustice” (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 46).   
As a consequence of the above, it has been proposed that the “who” of al-Qaeda 
source recruitment lies in concentrating efforts on the Type B terrorists. The thesis will 
now turn the discussion to “where” to look for Type B and “How” to distinguish the Type 
B terrorists from the solidly Type A terrorists, who are less recruitable.  
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A. RISK AND COMMITMENT 
What drives an individual to live a stressful, clandestine life as a member of a 
terrorist organization? (Ansary, 2009, p. 5). Although the New York City Police 
Department’s study of the four-stage radicalization process provides a convincing model, 
it begs the question why some individuals progress further down the path of 
radicalization to involvement in armed attacks and even suicide missions, while others 
regulate their involvement to participation along the fringes of the group.  Assuming that 
two individuals have exactly the same exposure to the elements of the four-stage process 
and share Sageman’s (2004) factors of friendship, kinship, discipleship, and even the 
same link to the jihad, what factors explain why certain individuals fall short of full 
commitment to terrorism expressed through violent acts?  How can some individuals who 
are connected or have access to Type A terrorists and who remain immersed for years in 
a culture glorifying heroic martyrdom and even participate at some level in the support 
structure of al-Qaeda not progress completely through all four stages of radicalization?  
Others, it would seem, are swept-up in a relatively short period of time to deadly actions.  
Still others reverse course, moving from Type A to Type B status.  These questions speak 
to the differences between Type A terrorists and the three variations of Type B terrorists.   
The answers to such complex questions are also likely to be complex and 
multifaceted.  However, one possible explanation worth serious consideration is available 
in the theory of Princeton’s Dr. Jacob Shapiro (2008) involving the positive correlation 
between the willingness of terrorists to accept risks and their ideological commitment.  In 
addition to the work of Davis and Jenkins and Clark McCauley’s insights on 
differentiating between the two forms of aggression, Shapiro’s work can also be 
interpreted to shed insight on the “who” of terrorism recruitment, but also the “where.”  
Shapiro writes, “Substantial evidence indicates that members of terrorist groups 
are not uniformly motivated by the cause, are not equally willing to sacrifice for the 
cause, often disagree on what the cause is, and rarely see eye-to-eye on the best tactics to 
achieve their strategic end” (Shapiro, 2008, p. 10).  In essence, there is a disparity in the 
preferences between the leaders and middlemen in a terrorist organization, which is 
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reflected in the variance of their commitment (Shapiro, 2008).  Shapiro (2008) believes 
this ensures that the most ideologically committed, what the author would argue are the 
Type A, are most likely to volunteer for the most dangerous missions (Shapiro, 2005).  
While the less committed, what the author would argue corresponds to the Type B, 
survive within the organization longer because they employ themselves in less risky 
manners.  As Dr. Shapiro said: 
Terrorist groups face two adverse selection problems. The first is that 
those likely to survive long in terrorist networks tend to be less 
ideologically committed as they are less likely to volunteer for the most 
dangerous missions. The second is that because participation as a financier 
or logistician is less risky than participating as a local leader or operator, 
middlemen in terrorist organizations will tend to be less committed. (2008, 
5) 
By this convincing logic, the most ideologically committed individuals will 
progress further through the four-stages of radicalization and gravitate to those positions 
within their organization attached to the highest risks.  Risk implies they have the greatest 
chances of being pursued, captured, or targeted for elimination by counter-terrorism 
forces.  As their commitment to an ideology wanes, this also provides at least one 
explanation for the migration of former Type A to Type B terroists.  Friedrich Nietzsche 
might have described the more committed terrorists as “the ambitious” (as cited in 
Kaufmann & Hollingdale, 1967). These were “other men who want power even 
accompanied by obvious disadvantages and sacrifices in happiness and well-being” 
(Nietzsche as cited in Kaufmann & Hollingdale, 1967), such as the stress of a clandestine 
life and attachment to the most dangerous jobs with the greatest risk of lengthy 
imprisonment or death. 
The higher, risk-inclined organizational positions occupied by these ambitious 
terrorists would obviously include those directly involved in the conduct of deadly 
attacks.  The ideological commitment of these particular terrorists is readily inherent in 




government elimination. Examples of the positions owned by the more committed 
terrorists include the leadership posts, bomb makers, and members of a group’s armed 
faction.   
Fulfillment of these higher-risk positions, in which arrest or death is a daily 
possibility, may only help to further reinforce ideological commitment and group-think 
through the affects of mortality salience.  As political scientist Dr. Rose McDermott and 
world renowned psychologist Dr. Philip Zimbardo state, “…human behavior is 
significantly affected by anything that makes people aware of their own potential death or 
sensitizes them to their mortality” (McDermott & Zimardo, 2007, p. 363). One of the 
results of this sensitization is reinforcement of existing worldviews. As McDermott and 
Zimbardo report: 
When mortality is made salient, people find others who conform to their 
own worldview to be more attractive, while judging those who threaten 
their worldview to be less so (Greenberg et al., 1990).  In particular, 
subjects evaluate those who praise their cultural worldview especially 
positively and assess those who criticize it especially negatively. (2007, p. 
363)  
Not only does mortality salience increase group-think and increase negative 
perceptions of those holding non-conforming worldviews, but it also “induces a 
preferential search for confirmatory evidence” and affects aggression (McDermott & 
Zimardo, 2007, p. 365).  Dr’s McDermott and Zimbardo (2007, p 364) also note that 
“Subjects whose mortality is made salient show increased aggression toward those who 
threaten their worldview.” This suggests that those holding the most risk-prone positions 
within a terrorist group receive the benefit (or curse) of ideological confirmation—yet 
another reason why the Type A terrorists are less likely to be successfully recruited.    
A logical inference in Shapiro’s theory on risk and ideological commitment is that 
a positive correlation exists between an increased ideological commitment and the 
willingness of certain terrorists to discard their anonymity and accept the greater risks of 
public self-identification and confirmation of their terrorist associations. Usama Bin 
Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri are obvious examples of this commitment, but are 
certainly not the only examples of this behavior.   
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Conversely, the less committed terrorists therefore are more likely to be involved 
in risky, albeit far less dangerous, support functions. This answers the question of 
“where” to look for the Type B terrorists. The Type B is to be located in the support 
elements of the organization, befitting their comparatively lower levels of risk and 
commitment. Shapiro (2008) noted that these less risky positions include financiers or 
logisticians. The author would add to the list such diverse jobs as media and propaganda 
personnel, political-front members, recruiters, and especially individuals in dawa 
elements of an organization engaged in charitable enterprises. Whether a terrorist group 
resembles a more traditional hierarchical business model or a more dispersed, flatter, less 
top-down command structure, it makes sense that the less committed terrorists are more 
likely to be near the safer edges of the organization rather than at its dangerous core.   
According to Steve Ressler (2006), “The basis of social network analysis (also 
known as network science or network sociology) is that individual nodes (which, 
depending on the type of network, can be people, events, etc.) are connected by complex 
yet understandable relationships that form networks. These networks are ubiquitous, with 
an underlying order and simple laws. Networks form the structural basis of many natural 
events, organizations, and social processes.” Dr. Gordon Woo, who has applied social 
network analysis to the study of terrorist groups, has drawn conclusions from his work 
which complements Shapiro’s logic and provides further support for targeting the Type B 
terrorists.  Woo argues that the individuals furthest from the hub of a terrorist network are 
more vulnerable and accessible: “Furthermore, it may be easier to detain and get 
information about a person more at the periphery of a terrorist organization, than from 
someone at a hub, who has extra identity protection and is more security-conscious” 
(Woo, 2008, p. 7).   
Arguably, one counter-reason for not concentrating recruitment efforts on the 
Type B individuals at the periphery of al-Qaeda would be a belief that they are not as 
informed of the details of specific plots as the Type A individuals involved in planning 
violent actions, such as the professional cadre of al-Qaeda Central. But the recruitment of 
Type B terrorists on the periphery of the group is still a valuable exercise which can lead 
to the identification of the professional cadre and the Type As who must be eradicated.  
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Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s support functions cannot be assumed to be staffed 
exclusively by Type B terrorists. Al-Qaeda’s Benevolence International Fund, an alleged 
humanitarian relief organization which operated in the United States and elsewhere, for 
instance, was used as cover by several al-Qaeda terrorists for travel and obtaining 
identification documentation. (Burr & Collins, 2006, p. 268).  There is certainly nothing 
that would preclude a Type A terrorist with involvement in the preparation of acts of 
terrorism from being employed full-time in an al-Qaeda-associated business, including an 
alleged humanitarian organization on the periphery of the group. Examples within other 
Sunni terrorist groups of Type A terrorists obtaining cover as employees of humanitarian 
organizations while being simultaneously involved in terrorist attacks are known.   
The HAMAS cases of Jamal Abd al-Shamal Abu Hija and Ibrahim Hassan Ali 
Jaber are particularly instructive on this point. By day, Abu Hija and Jaber appeared to be 
members of HAMAS’ ubiquitous dawa structure, as evidenced by their employment on 
the Jenin Charitable Committee.  Furthermore, Abu Hija was a supervisor for a Koran 
memorization center (Levitt, 2006, p. 96). But according to Israeli authorities, Abu Hija 
headed groups which forwarded suicide bombers into Israel, while Jaber “was involved 
in planning attacks, transporting explosive devices, giving military training and 
possessing weapons” (Levitt, 2006, p. 96). As Nietzsche noted, “One should be aware of 
assessing the value of a man according to a single deed” (As cited in Kaufmann & 
Hollindale, 1967, p. 392.)   
Ironically, although the more risk-inclined individuals are also eventually more 
likely to be publicly identified as terrorists through their activities, notoriety, and public 
statements, they are by the necessity of security also more insulated, more likely to live 
clandestine lives and the most difficult to find and access. The paragon example is Usama 
Bin Ladin.  As the most wanted terrorist on the planet with an incredible bounty on his 
head, he nevertheless regularly addresses the world through public announcements while 
being able to remain concealed. Consequently, these risk-inclined terrorists are less likely 
to be accessible for source recruitment, in addition to the other drawbacks they bring to 
source recruitment as probable Type A terrorists. Paul Pillar of the Brookings Institute 
succinctly noted the problem this way: 
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Those who are closest to the center of decision making in a group (and 
thus most likely to be witting of all its operations) are the ones least likely 
to betray it and thus most resistant to recruitment as intelligence sources.   
Besides this problem of motivation, any attempt to recruit such individuals 
also faces a problem of access—of getting to them and cultivating 
relationships with them. (2001, p. 111) 
B. LESSONS FROM THE MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS 
Research accomplished on the terrorist network which conducted the March 11, 
2004 bombings of the Madrid trains uncovered some interesting points with applicability  
for differentiating Type A and Type B terrorists. For researchers Javier Jordan, Fernando 
Manas and Nicola Horsburgh (2008), the terrorists involved in the Madrid bombings are 
part of the “grass root jihadist network,” or GJN.  They defined the GJN as follows: 
A group of individuals that accept the strategic objectives (top-level goals 
and aims) of the Global Jihad Movement and attempt to contribute to these 
from their country of residence.  The leaders and members of a GJN do 
not belong formally to the hierarchical structure of Al Qaeda or other 
associated GJMV [Global Jihad Movement] organizations, although 
generally they might have links to members of these organizations. 
(Jordan, Manas, Horsburgh, 2008, p. 18) 
This definition of GJN corresponds to a combination of Hoffman’s al-Qaeda 
locals and al-Qaeda network. The Madrid GJN included 45 individuals by the standards 
of the researchers, who narrowed substantially the total number of persons associated 
with the GJN to focus only on those persons who “presumably participated or 
collaborated in the bombings” (Jordan et al., 2008). The vast majority of these 45 
individuals had no connections to al-Qaeda or other recognized terrorist groups (Jordan et 
al., 2008). This fact alone should serve as a warning to investigating agents not to 
narrowly target either their investigations or source candidates strictly to those 
individuals with established links to al-Qaeda. However, there were several links 
amongst a few individuals to terrorists in al-Qaeda and other recognizable terrorist groups 
within the GJMV (Jordan et al., 2008).   
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Significantly, amongst the Madrid GJN, the researchers determined through a 
study of the employment characteristics of these 45 individuals that there existed “part-
time militant jihadism” and “full-time militant jihadism” (Jordan et al., 2008, p. 22). 
These two characterizations correspond well with the Type B and Type A terrorist sets, 
respectively, as well as the discussion on risk and commitment.  
The part-time jihadists were unremarkable in their daily lives. (Jordan et al., 
2008). Echoing what Jacob Shapiro noted about risk and commitment, the researchers of 
the Madrid GJN noted that the “commitment” of the part-time jihadists “was principally 
based on attendance to meetings, discussing the Jihad; frequent contact with members of 
the group; or illicit funding activities” (Jordan et al., 2008, p. 22). Indeed, many of these 
activities would be difficult to prosecute in most Western-style democracies, which was a 
problem noted by the authors (Jordan et al., 2008). Aside from some illicit criminal 
activities, the part-time jihadists remained engaged in society. They may have had one 
foot in the culture of jihad, but the practical side of these individuals kept them rooted to 
their jobs as well and limited the extent of their involvement to what can only be 
described as peripheral activities.   
In contrast, the full-time jihadists within this GJN comprised a smaller number of 
the total of 45 individuals. The full-time jihadists were characterized as the “leaders and 
seriously committed” (Jordan et al., 2008). Some of these individuals quit their jobs 
before the attack and subsisted on money provided by others within the GJN, as well as 
money garnered mostly from petty crime (Jordan et al., 2008). In this description, one can 
see the Type B terrorist severing his practical ties to society, dedicating himself to his 
cause, and moving into the Type A set. And, as a matter of practical necessity, these full-
time, Type As survive, in part, from donations provided by their part-time, Type B 
counterparts. 
Could the preservation of employment by the part-time jihadists be viewed as 
essentially an unwillingness to detach themselves from their host society and existing life 
style? If so, is it also possible that this unwillingness to go the next step and quit their 
employment, unlike the full-time jihadists, is an attempt to retain a symbolic grip on their  
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unremarkable lives, to which they would retreat from terrorism if given the assistance to 
gracefully extricate themselves from the network? These seem wholly plausible 
possibilities when considering two facts about these GJN’s.    
First, contrary to the image or characterization of these terrorists as maladjusted 
immigrant youths with little attachment to their host society and without hope for a 
future, the researchers found that social marginalization was not a major determinant in 
adherence to militant jihadism (Jordan et al., 2008). This seems consistent with what was 
noted earlier by both Dr. Moghaddam and Dr. McCauley regarding perceptions, feelings, 
and the subjective determination of injustice and the measurement of grievances based on 
how well one’s group, such as the Islamic community or ummah, does in comparison to 
others. In order for these terrorists involved in the Madrid train bombings to be embroiled 
in these attacks, it is not necessary that they be personally marginalized by society. 
As one measure of social integration, the 45 terrorists in the Madrid GJN were 
split almost 50 percent in terms of being married, with many having large families 
(Jordan et al., 2008). The evidence of social integration was actually noted by researchers 
of the Madrid GJN as a surprising characteristic of this network. Therefore, if many of 
these socially integrated terrorists were only participating on the fringes of the network as 
part-time jihadists, were not socially marginalized, and were unwilling to sever their 
unemployment, then it seems difficult to argue that they could not be returned to their 
pre-jihad lives given the influence of rewards and punishments matched to their needs or 
fears.   
The second point involves the nature of how one joins a GJN, which matches well 
with Sageman’s earlier insights. Researchers cited several examples of strong social 
bonds amongst this network including childhood friendships, siblings and relationships 
through marriage (Jordan et al., 2008). When one couples the importance of “friendship, 
kinship and discipleship” (Sageman, 2004) with the fact that many of the Madrid GJN 
were socially integrated, part-time jihadists who maintained their employment and 




individuals within the GJN who are ideologically uncommitted or under-committed.  
They might arguably have been swept along in the network’s activities by the strength of 
their social bonds. 
An important point from the Madrid GJN is that while some of these 
uncommitted, fringe participants may have contributed little to the bombings, as 
participants within this group they nevertheless had access to intelligence through their 
inclusion in discussions and contacts with other part-time and full-time jihadists. This 
makes them valuable potential intelligence sources.   
Operationally speaking, it seems it would have made more sense for these full-
time jihadists to maintain their employment, if only for the sake of cover and for a more 
reliable, less risky source of funds for their jihad. This possibly rash behavior might 
reasonably be interpreted not only as a personal act of devotion or ideological 
commitment, but also as a public signal to their fellow GJN members of their seriousness 
and intent. Like Cortez burning his ships on the beach so that his fellow conquistadors 
had to march forward, the full-time jihadists in this GJN symbolically, at least, also 
signaled that their only course was forward when they turned their back on their host 
society by terminating their employment. At least within the Madrid grass-roots jihad 
network then, differentiating between the Type A and B terrorists appears to be 
measureable by the “commitment” of these terrorists to partially or fully commit 
themselves to their jihad.   
C. SOCIAL INTENSITY SYNDROME (SIS) 
Recently, psychologist Dr. Philip Zimbardo conceptualized a series of male-
oriented behaviors he calls Social Intensity Syndrome (SIS) (Zimbardo, 2008). This 
emergent work may have practical applications for terrorist source recruitment.  Some 
possibilities of SIS application include differentiating between Type A and B al-Qaeda 
terrorists, providing further insight into the psychological and social forces which support 
terrorist recruitment and in determining which terrorists might be more susceptible to 
influences which can be used to separate them from their terrorist-based social 
attachments. What makes SIS attractive with respect to this thesis are the conceptual 
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assumptions underlying SIS, which match well and provide additional understanding for 
Sageman’s findings on “friendship, kinship and discipleship” as the compelling force 
behind terrorism recruitment, the findings regarding part-time and full-time jihadists, and 
Dr. Shapiro’s work on risk and commitment.  
Social Intensity Syndrome is primarily concerned with the need for men to be 
associated with other men in “certain male dominated social groupings” (Zimbardo, 
2008). Zimbardo posits eight conceptual assumptions of SIS:  
1. Men, more than women, are attracted to social settings that involve the 
ubiquitous presence of a group of other men, over an extended period. 
2. That attraction is greater the more intense the nature of the relationship, 
the more exclusive it is of tolerating “outsiders” or those who have not 
qualified for that group membership, and the more embedded each man is 
perceived to be within that group.  
3. Examples of such social groups are the military, especially during boot 
camp and deployment, gangs, contact team sports, fraternities, prisons, 
some cults, and bars. 
4. Men experience a positive arousal, such as cortisol, adrenergic system 
activation (or testosterone increase) when they feel they are part of such an 
all male social group. 
5. Men adapt to that level of social intensity contact as an optimally desired 
personal and social state. 
6. Over time, that degree of social intensity becomes a “set point” of 
desirable functioning, operating at a non-conscious level. 
7. Men experience a sense of isolation and then boredom immediately 
following their separation from such socially intense group settings. 
8. Men experience withdrawal symptoms when removed from such socially 
intense group settings, which are greater the longer the prior duration of 
their group participation. 
Social Intensity Syndrome “SIS” is the descriptive term for this complex of 
values, attitudes, and behaviors organized around personal attraction to and desire to 
maintain association with these male dominated social groupings (Zimbardo, 2008). 
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A terrorist group, Zimbardo agrees (2008), would definitely be inclusive of the 
male oriented social groups to which men are attracted. Independently, political 
psychologist John Horgan of Pennsylvania State’s International Center for the Study of 
Terrorism provided his rationale for the attraction of men to terrorist groups, which 
bolsters Zimbardo’s work on Social Intensity Syndrome. In an interview with the New 
York Times, Horgan said, 
We’re finding that they don’t generally join for religious reasons.  
Terrorist movements seem to provide a sense of adventure, excitement, 
vision, purpose, camaraderie and involvement with them has an allure that 
can be difficult to resist.  But the ideology is usually something you 
acquire once you’re involved. (Zoepf, 2008) 
While many terrorist groups include females, even other radical Islamic groups, 
there are good reasons to believe that al-Qaeda is a male-dominated, misogynistic group.  
This is not to suggest that women have neither been connected to al-Qaeda nor that al-
Qaeda is not willing to pragmatically use women as tools, even in attacks.  But, aside 
from the obvious Islamic imperatives separating the sexes and denigrating women to 
subservient roles, (Moghadamm, 2008) which is demonstrably taken to extremes with al-
Qaeda allies like the Taliban, where is the evidence suggesting that female al-Qaeda 
operatives hold senior or even influential positions within the group or that female 
terrorists have constituted the inner circle of a clandestine, mixed-sex, al-Qaeda cell?   
Interestingly, one of Dr. Zimbardo’s behavioral predictions for high levels of SIS is that 
“These men are more likely to develop generally negative attitudes toward women as ‘the 
other’ who do not understand them, and prefer pornography and sex with prostitutes over 
consensual sexual relationships with equal status female mates (Zimbardo, 2008). 
The terrorist group or a subset of the group, such as a cell, also coincidently 
exhibits other tendencies reflective of the underlying assumptions of SIS.  For instance, 
in Zimbardo’s third underlying assumption, his description of an intense social grouping, 
such as the “military, especially during boot camp,” is largely analogous to attendance at 
a jihadist training camp. And, inclusion in a clandestine element of al-Qaeda, in all of Dr. 
Hoffman’s categories, must qualify as both “intense” and “exclusive,” elements 
mentioned in point two.  In fact, al-Qaeda arguably exhibits at least two factors which 
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indicate it thinks of itself as an elite organization, which must further increase its draw 
and importance within the framework of Social Intensity Syndrome to jihadists-inclined 
males who subscribe to the veracity of these factors.  
First, at least the category of al-Qaeda Central envisions itself as the “vanguard” 
of a larger Islamic movement capable of destroying Western civilization (Hart, 2008). 
Second, al-Qaeda’s takfiri influenced version of Islam is also a possible marker of elitist 
thinking, (which as noted in the counter-ideological program of Saudi Arabia is a marker 
for potential terrorism proclivities) as it provides al-Qaeda with the ideological basis to 
justify itself as an arbiter of Islamic righteousness and piety with a divinely derived 
mandate to remove and kill “un-Islamic” rulers and other fallen Muslims. Central 
Intelligence Agency analyst Martin J. Hart eluded to both of these points when he wrote,  
“As a result, al-Qaeda has remained an elitist movement that draws general Muslim 
approval for trying to reduce U.S. power, but it fails to attract participation from most 
Muslims because of its hardcore fundamentalist message” (Hart, 2008).    
Dr. Zimbardo’s perspective of SIS is mainly concerned with predictions of 
negative behavioral tendencies associated with individuals with a high-level of SIS who 
are separated from their intense, male-dominated social groupings. An example would 
include soldiers returning from war to comparatively boring and pedestrian jobs and 
home lives, who consequently find great difficulty in adjusting (Zimbardo, 2008). 
Two indicators of a high-level of SIS identified by Dr. Zimbardo have potential 
application for this thesis.  First, he believes that an individual’s willingness to place 
greater value on their male dominated in-group over family is probably a very strong SIS 
indicator (Zimbardo, 2008).  Second, he believes it more probable than another indicator 
of high SIS is that males are willing to minimize the danger of being within their 
particular male-ubiquitous social grouping (Zimbardo, 2008).  A compelling example is 
the willingness of soldiers who were anxious to return home while in combat who 
become equally anxious to return to their combat units after the boredom and anxiety of 
separation from their social group sets in (Zimbardo, 2008).   
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The author would suggest these two indicators of high SIS are supportive of the 
findings of the GJN in Spain regarding part-time versus full-time jihadis, as well as Dr. 
Shapiro’s work on risk and commitment. The part-time members of the GJN, as an 
example, were on the periphery of the organization which bombed the Madrid trains.  
Their part-time jihadism reflected a loose attachment to this terrorist group, which would 
logically correspond with a lower level of SIS. As the researchers of the GJN noted, these 
part-time jihadists were unremarkable in their daily lives. They had not separated from 
their jobs or extricated themselves from society. It would not follow logically to expect 
then that these part-time jihadists placed greater value with belonging to the terrorist 
group than with their families, which as argued earlier was recognized by Dr. Zimbardo 
as a very strong indicator of high levels of SIS.  
Similarly, for the second of these two indicators of high levels of SIS, if Type A 
terrorists are more ideologically committed and likely to be involved in group positions 
entailing greater risks, might one possible explanation for this willingness to accept these 
greater risks rest not only in greater ideological commitment, but in a correspondingly 
higher level of SIS?  Is it possible that high-levels of SIS and the attractive pull of the 
group, might, in fact, enforce an individual’s willingness to accept the group’s ideology? 
Consequently, what SIS suggests for improving source recruitment is intriguing. 
Terrorist source candidates who exhibit indicators of low SIS should feel less of an 
attractive pull by their terrorist groups. Therefore, these candidates should be easier to 
recruit than those candidates who have a high level of SIS; they should, like Type B 
terrorists and those displaying instrumental aggression, be more sensitive to influence 
measures. One analogy which might be useful in highlighting this point is military re-
enlistment.  Those soldiers who demonstrate high levels of SIS should be easier to re-
enlist, especially back into their intense, exclusive social groupings, such as combat units, 
than those who had low levels of SIS when they departed their units.   
At the practical level, what SIS should suggest for the recruiting agent is to look 
for signs that a recruitment candidate’s terrorist associations are comprised of weak social 
bonds.  Indicators should include “part-time jihadism,” but should concomitantly include 
indicators of strong attachments to other social groupings and activities unconnected to 
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their terrorist associations, such as family, business, and hobbies. Additionally, 
recruitment candidates who are not misogynistic may be correspondingly less affected by 
SIS and should be better recruitment candidates than those that demonstrate negative 
attitudes towards women. This can be possibly detected by observing if the candidate is 
willing to participate in activities or social groupings which involve women outside of 
their immediate family as equal or near-equal partners, or it may be tested via staged 
female contact and interviews. However, it should be obvious that cultural considerations 
must be accounted for in this area.  
Finally, the author has two thoughts regarding SIS and Marc Sageman’s work. 
Sageman (2004, p. 180) concluded from his study that “The best avenue for penetration 
lies in recruitment from the pool of those who went through the training but decided not 
to join the jihad.” This statement makes exceptional sense against the backdrop of Dr. 
Zimbardo’s SIS. Interpreted in this light, those individuals for whom the pull of an 
intense, exclusive social grouping, as one would expect in a terrorist training camp, is 
insufficient to keep them involved are probably not affected with high levels of SIS.  If 
they quit such a camp, this may be a strong indicator that they are not cut-out to be full-
time jihadists, possibly not as ideologically committed as their counterparts, and, 
consequently, not destined for positions of high-risk; they are Type B terrorists. 
Second, SIS provides depth in understanding to Sageman’s work (2004, p. 135). 
on jihadist recruitment being a factor of “kinship, friendship and discipleship.” SIS 
provides a tool with which to examine and better understand why some male terrorists 
succumb to kinship, friendship and discipleship, while others are seemingly less affected.  
Although SIS is in its nascent stages, its logical underlying assumptions and 
complementariness with previously discussed findings make it another tool to be 
considered when gauging an al-Qaeda terrorist’s recruitability.   
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IX. ACCESS TO THE TERRORIST NETWORK THROUGH THE 
TYPE B 
…‘like a thread unraveling a sweater.’ Terrorists will be mindful that the 
initial dangerous loose thread might be a raw recruit, or peripheral 
affiliate. (Woo, 2008, p. 6) 
Dr. Gordon Woo 
Are Type B terrorists worth the effort of recruitment?  If accessible, vulnerable, 
yet less ideologically committed Type B terrorists are to be found on the periphery of the 
organization, does their peripheral involvement lessen the argument that they are valuable 
potential intelligence sources, especially in comparison to the Type A terrorists?  
Gordon Woo points out through his research applying social network analysis to 
terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that even the least important member of a terrorist 
group can be instrumental in developing significant intelligence on other more important 
members of the organization through their links (2008). In Woo’s work, he notes the 
experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram and others which demonstrate the 
interconnectedness of individuals and provides a terrorism example: 
It is a small world, as much as for terrorists as for everyone else. A human 
chain of six links should be about sufficient to connect anyone on the 
planet to anybody else. The intelligence services required a chain of just 
three links to get to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  First, Jordanian intelligence 
officers captured one of Zarqawi’s junior operatives, Ziad Khalaf al-
Zerbouly, who was working as a customs official, helping in smuggling 
money and materiel. Although ignorant of Zarqawi’s whereabouts, under 
interrogation, Kerbouly revealed the name of Zarqawi’s new spiritual 
advisor: Sheikh Abdel Rahman.  A US special forces team located 
Rahman, placed him under surveillance, and tailed him to a house near 
Baqubah, where he had his fatal meeting with Zarqawi. “As in the 
manhunt for Zarqawi, the interrogation, or surveillance, of any known 
network operative, even a lowly foot-soldier, can be instrumental in 
providing sequential leads for tracking down senior leaders in the terrorist 
hierarchy.” (2008, p. 8) 
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The British government, in its report on the July 7, 2005 bombings in London 
came to a similar conclusion in its lessons learned from this major attack which killed 52 
and injured hundreds (Murphy, 2006, p. 2). Although the terrorists in this attack where 
not “al-Qaeda Central” or even “al-Qaeda affiliates or associates,” as a result of these 
attacks, the British government revised their intelligence requirements. The result was 
more priority placed on the terrorists who are, by an assessment of their risk, 
commitment, and organizational responsibilities, more likely to be Type B terrorists, 
involved in “facilitating or funding terrorist activities” (Murphy, 2006, p. 32). This 
stemmed from the British government’s belief that “the activities of facilitators can be 
critical to identifying the next plot, and also in recognition of the speed at which 
individuals can move from facilitation to attack planning” (Murphy, 2006, p. 32).   
P[ Other terrorism experts would agree that de-valuing terrorists because they are 
linked to the support or peripheral elements, versus the operational or military wing of 
terrorist organizations, is unwise. Even when terrorist organizations have well-developed 
social and military wings, such as HAMAS, the reality is that these wings are at best 
separated by a semi-permeable membrane, not a solid wall. According to Dr. Mathew 
Levitt (2008), an expert on HAMAS, the social wing of HAMAS has often been used as a 
way to support the operational activities of the military wing, including the provision of 
respectable day jobs as cover for night-time killers. In reality, there is no separation of the 
social and military wings (Levitt, 2008). And when speaking more directly about al-
Qaeda, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna also agrees that it is necessary to attack these support 
elements, where it has been argued in this thesis that Type B terrorists of lesser 
commitment and risk are more likely to be found and accessible as recruitable sources. 
He noted, “When fighting terrorism, it is essential that governments and the public 
understand that operational cells cannot survive without support cells” (Gunaratna, 2007, 
p. 186). Finally, on this point, research on the Madrid GJN noted that the full-time 
jihadists subsisted, in part, from the assistance of their still employed, part-time 
counterparts, what the author argues are Type B terrorists.  For the support networks to  
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be so critical to the operational elements, which are the locus of the Type A terrorists, the 
support networks must be connected to the operational elements.  It is within these 
support networks where the Type Bs are most likely to be found.   
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X. TESTING THE TOOLS  
A. TWO UNIQUE CASE STUDIES  
How can the ideas presented in this thesis be discussed and tested in an 
unclassified manner to determine their utility as tools to improve the recruitment of al-
Qaeda sources?  The author’s approach is to examine, in detail, two former al-Qaeda-
linked individuals with whom the author had personal dealings. Contact with these two 
individuals occurred from approximately 1998–2006, in the author’s official capacity as a 
special agent of the FBI, which was known to the subjects. Contact with the first subject 
was more investigative and brief. Contact with the second subject was more extensive, 
spanning several years. Neither subject was under arrest or incarcerated at the time of the 
author’s contact. All discussions with these subjects occurred in English, which they 
speak fluently.   
This personal contact arguably allows for greater insight and reflection on the 
application of the suggested tools than through a study purely comprised by reviewing 
documents. Although these two case studies involved individuals with confirmed links to 
al-Qaeda and contact with the FBI, they can, fortunately, be sourced academically to 
unclassified documents. This is possible in these two instances because the activities of 
these individuals were publicly exposed through the judicial process.    
These two case studies have several interesting dynamics in common, which 
makes their comparison more meaningful.  One key dynamic is that each man knew the 
other very well. They knew each other many years before the existence of al-Qaeda; both 
cut their jihadist teeth in the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad. They were also both associates 
and contemporaries at the same point in time within al-Qaeda and had verifiable access to 
some of the same al-Qaeda Central figures. In fact, they cooperated on several al-Qaeda-
linked issues. They are also approximately the same age, both grew-up in Kuwait, are 
both family men, are both naturalized U.S. citizens, and were both inspired by the jihadist 
ideologue Abdullah Azzam.  If these two men were examined for their potential to be 
recruited as sources, their similarities in background might lead to the mistaken belief 
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that they were either both recruitable or both un-recruitable.  In spite of these similarities, 
one individual refused to cooperate with FBI, while the other individual helped to convict 
the other man of al-Qaeda-related crimes.  
B. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The first of the two individuals analyzed in these case studies represents a solid 
Type A terrorist, who did not cooperate with the FBI. The second individual represents a 
Type B individual, who may have been migrating at one point to Type A status, but 
ultimately did not. This assessment is predicated on the known outcome of their 
responses to requests for cooperation on al-Qaeda matters when approached by the FBI 
and a retroactive review of their backgrounds and personalities as compared to Davis and 
Jenkin’s descriptions of Type A and B terrorists. The Type A individual did not 
cooperate with the FBI, even when it was in his best interests to do so and the stakes were 
personally very high. The Type B, on the other hand, cooperated extensively and publicly 
in court with the FBI. Labeling these individuals in this manner is consistent with 
McCauley’s work about the sensitivity to rewards and punishments.  As noted, it would 
be expected that the Type A terrorist would be less sensitive and the Type B terrorist 
more influenced by the rewards and punishments which FBI agents could offer in seeking 
an individual’s cooperation. However, knowing the outcome to the question of 
cooperation (whether an individual did or did not cooperate with the FBI as a source) as 
the means to determining if they are the more approachable Type B terrorist would be 
circular logic. Since an individual’s terrorist type cannot be practically assessed based on 
their cooperativeness, what is the method to determine terrorist type in advance of a 
recruitment effort?    
The solution to assessing whether an individual is a Type A or Type B terrorist is 
to examine details of that individual’s background through the lenses of other factors 
already presented in this thesis. These lenses include risk and commitment, instrumental 
or emotional aggression, full-time or part-commitment to jihad, and high or low levels of 
Social Identity Syndrome. Assessments made through these lenses can provide an  
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assessment as to whether an individual is a Type A or B terrorist, and can made upon 
background information about the potential source acquired from existing investigative 
techniques.  
C. CASE STUDY CRITERIA 
Both case studies are reviewed using the same criteria.  However, since contact 
with these individuals was in the course of work predating this thesis, the information 
about each individual’s background and activities is admittedly not uniform for each 
criterion.  But non-uniformity is a reality of any field work in this subject, particularly as 
agents will have greater access and observation of some individuals than others, and 
some subjects will be more successful in concealing their backgrounds, feelings, 
intentions, and histories.   
Strict tests or measurements from the fields of psychology or other academic 
fields were not used when this author originally interacted with these individuals, nor 
when the author examined them through the criteria to be discussed.   This is not a 
detractor. On the contrary, one of the important, unstated assumptions of this thesis is that 
any suggestions for improving the recruitment process of terrorist sources needs to be 
simple, practical, and applicable by the numerous non-specialist agents in the field 
investigating and having contact with terrorist-linked individuals on a daily basis.  Most 
agents are not professional psychologists, sociologists, or blessed with the subject’s 
cooperativeness. As such, it would be impractical if suggested tools attempted to mimic 
exacting clinical assessments. Furthermore, most agents will only observe their potential 
recruitment targets from afar or indirectly. These tools must be applicable to agents who 
know about their potential recruitment targets from conducting surveillance of them, 
listening to their legally recorded conversations, reviewing open source and government 
documents about them, having indirect or fleeting contact with them, or by reviewing 
information about them provided from co-workers, family members, or even other 
recruited sources. Creating tools which are too clinical, cumbersome or which require 
academic or medical expertise would destroy their practicality.  With that said, these are 
the criteria used to examine these two subjects: 
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1. Is the Subject Type A or Type B Terrorist? 
Was the subject cooperative with the FBI by providing useful intelligence on al-
Qaeda? Or, as would be predicted by McCauley, was the subject less sensitive to rewards 
and punishments? Did the subject attempt to protect individuals associated with his al-
Qaeda in-group, even at his own personal expense?  What was the ultimate result of the 
FBI’s approach to this individual in terms of their recruitment potential?  This question 
establishes if the individual is a Type A or Type B terrorist.  
2. What is the Subject’s Background? 
What are his ethnicity, age, marital status, education, and economic status?  
3. With which Category of Al-Qaeda, Using Hoffman’s Definitions, did 
the Subject have an Association?  
Al-Qaeda Central, al-Qaeda associates and affiliates, al-Qaeda locals, or the al-
Qaeda Network? 
4. What was the Subject’s Level of Risk and Commitment with Their 
Al-Qaeda Category? 
Did the subject hold a formal or informal position within an al-Qaeda category 
and, if so, how much subjective risk did this involve?  Was the subject loosely affiliated 
within their category? Was the subject’s position or association within their al-Qaeda 
category covert or provide some level of anonymity, or did it expose him publicly to 
police and intelligence agencies by directly connecting him to other known al-Qaeda 
figures or activities?     
5. Did the Subject Display Instrumental or Emotional Aggression? 
Did the subject engage in activities, discussions, or provide other reasons to 
suggest he engaged in aggression which “does not calculate long-term consequences” or 
“aggression as a means to other ends” (McCauley, 2007, p. 8). Was the subject engaged 
in anger directed to hurt someone?  If he was offered positive incentives or advised of the 
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negative consequences of not cooperating with the FBI or other police or intelligence 
agencies, how did this compare to McCauley’s suggestion on instrumental and emotional 
aggression: “emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and 
punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive” [bold and italics added] 
(2007, p. 8).  
6. Was the Subject a Part-time or Full-time Jihadist? 
As learned from the lessons of the Madrid bombings, did the subject have 
meaningful employment outside of the jihad, or was his employment simply cover?  Did 
the subject essentially sever his societal ties to fully commit themselves to their cause or 
did they remain attached in meaningful ways to society outside of their terrorist in-group?  
7. Did the Subject Exhibit Signs of Low or High Social Intensity 
Syndrome? 
Did the subject demonstrate a willingness to place greater value on his male 
dominated in-group over family? Was he involved in other, non-male, social groupings, 
such as legitimate business activities?  Did he minimize the danger of being within his 
particular male-ubiquitous social grouping?  Is his a history of the subject being attached 
to an intense, exclusive. male-dominated social groups or rejecting such groups, such as a 
training camp? Is there a history of involvement in one or more jihads (Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Bosnia, Somalia, etc)? 
8. Case Study Conclusion 
What conclusion can be draw about the subject’s terrorist type from an analysis of 
the subject through the lenses of risk and commitment, instrumental and emotional 
aggression, full-time or part-time commitment to jihad, and high or low levels of Social 
Intensity Syndrome? Is this consistent with the subject’s assessment as a Type A or B 
terrorist based on their established cooperation with the FBI, or lack thereof? 
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XI. CASE STUDY ONE: WADIH EL-HAGE  
A. WADIH EL-HAGE 
U.S. citizen; al Qaeda operative; Bin Ladin’s personal assistant (National 
Commission, 2004 p. 435), convicted in embassy bombings trial. 
1. Is the Subject a Type A or Type B Terrorist? 
El-Hage is a Type A terrorist based upon his failure to seize upon opportunities to 
assist the FBI and, by doing so, help himself. This is discussed below.   
2. What is the Subject’s Background? 
Wadih El-Hage was born in Sidon, Lebanon in 1960 (Zill, 2001). His is married 
to an American convert named April Ray and has seven children.15El-Hage was raised 
Catholic, but according to his mother-in-law (also a convert to Islam), he accepted Islam 
when he was 14 and living in Kuwait, where his father was employed (Zill, 2001). His 
conversion led to his ouster from his home (Zill, 2001). According to his mother-in-law, 
El-Hage was supported by a sheikh in Kuwait from the time of his conversion until he 
graduated from college, and during this period became very devout (Zill, 2001).    
In 1978, at the age of 18, he moved to Louisiana where he pursued a degree in 
urban planning at the University of Southwestern Louisiana (Zill, 2001). While in 
university, he was not remembered for being particularly political (at least not openly) or 
academically gifted, but as already noted, he was religious (Zill, 2001).   
Towards the start of the Soviet Union’s invasion and war in Afghanistan, the 
outward signs of El-Hage’s devotion to his new religion and his long series of 
associations with jihadists became evident. El-Hage left the United States at some point 
after the jihad in Afghanistan started and moved himself, for the first of several times, to 
Pakistan to participate in the jihad (Zill, 2001). El-Hage’s birth defect, a withered right 
                                                 
15 Personal observations by author during his investigation of El-Hage.  
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arm, supposedly limited his ability to fight (Zill, 2001). His mother-in-law said of him, ” 
He cannot physically do a lot of things a soldier could do…His heart may have been in it 
(referring to the jihad), but he was more of a teacher, translator, go-between…He was a 
peacemaker” (Zill, 2001).  This description of his earliest jihadist activities would 
logically seem consistent with his birth defect and meek appearance; El-Hage stands 
maybe five feet, six inches in height and possibly weighs 130 lbs.   
In 1985, El-Hage left Pakistan, returned to school and then moved to Tuscon 
Arizona, where he met April Ray.  While in Tuscon, El-Hage remained involved in the 
Afghan jihad by working for the magazine Bunyan al Mahrsous. This magazine was 
dedicated to furthering the jihad in Afghanistan (Zill, 2001). In 1986, after an arranged 
marriage, they both moved to Pakistan where El-Hage again participated in the jihad 
(Peraino & Thomas, 2002). According to El-Hage’s wife, he assisted the jihad on this 
occasion “…carrying a gun and riding a motorcycle, he smuggled money, supplies and 
what Ray vaguely described as ‘stuff’ over the Pakistan border” (Peraino & Thomas, 
2002). Some of this “stuff” El-Hage smuggled was probably military related, including 
night-vision goggles for use by the mujahidin (Al-Ridi, 2001).    
April Ray’s description of El-Hage’s activities is at odds with his mother-in-law’s 
portrayal of him as a physically incapable individual (and therefore she also seemed to be 
intimating, not a legitimate terrorist). Smuggling money and “stuff” into a war zone 
presents El-Hage as a more militant and determined individual.  In fact, El-Hage, in spite 
of his physical limitations, may have actually participated in fighting in Afghanistan (Al-
Ridi, 2001). Whatever the truth may be of his exact involvement in Afghanistan, the 
benign description of El-Hage’s early jihadist activities by his mother-in-law, when 
coupled with his physical deformity and meek façade, should serve as a warning of 
assessing a potential source upon their appearance.  
At some point, prior to 1989, El-Hage returned to the United States from Pakistan 
and became a United States citizen. Still, El-Hage continued to be involved with 
committed jihadists and his new citizenship provided him with additional benefits for his 
activities.  
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In December 1989, at an Islamic conference in Oklahoma City, El-Hage was 
contracted by future convicted terrorist Mahmud Abouhalima to purchase weapons for 
Abouhalima’s use against the Jewish radical Rabbi Meir Khane, who was murdered in 
November 1990. (Zill, 2001). El-Hage’s defense in this matter was that the weapons he 
did purchase for Abouhalima were never picked up (Zill, 2001). Abouhalima, a fellow 
jihadist from Afghanistan, escaped prosecution for his role in Khane’s murder, but was 
later convicted for his key involvement in the first attack on the World Trade Center on 
26 February 1993 (Reeve, 1999). 
In early 1990, El-Hage hosted an unknown individual at his home in Tuscon and 
drove him to mosque (Zill, 2001). This unknown man was there to observe a 
controversial imam named Rashad Khalifa (Zill, 2001). Khalifa drew the ire of some 
Muslims by his Islamic practices, which included allowing men and woman to pray 
together (Zill, 2001). Shortly after the visit of this mysterious man whom El-Hage 
assisted in Tuscon, Khalifa was found murdered in his mosque (Zill, 2001). Contrary to 
El-Hage’s meek appearance and demeanor, “Prosecutors have repeatedly implied El 
Hage knows who committed the murder and may have been involved” (Zill, 2001).   
On March 1, 1991, El-Hage traveled to New York City to allegedly assist in the 
running of the AlKifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn (Zill, 2001). This center was part of 
the international network which assisted aspiring jihadists to travel to Afghanistan and 
was known informally as “al-Jihad” (Cooley, 2002, p. 69). The AlKifah Center was also 
associated with offices in Tuscon, where El-Hage was living, and Arlington, Texas, 
where he would eventually live. AlKifah in Brooklyn was itself part of the Mektab al-
Khidmat (Bureau of Services), the world-wide network established by Usama Bin Ladin 
and his mentor Abdallah Azzam to support the jihad in Afghanistan (National 
Commission, 2004).  El-Hage was also a follower of Azzam. His wife admitted that when 
Azzam was assassinated, El-Hage had been “jolted,” by his death, although apparently 
not enough to remove himself from his jihadist associations and activities (Peraino & 
Thomas, 2002).   
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Al-Qaeda eventually emerged from the Mektab al-Khidmat (Center for Non-
Proliferation Studies, 1988).  The day El-Hage arrived in New York, the Center’s 
director, Mustafa Shalabi, disappeared (Zill, 2001). The following week Shalabi’s 
“mutilated body was found in the apartment he and Mahmud Abouhalima shared” (Zill, 
2001).  This was the same Abouhalima who asked El-Hage to provide him weapons. 
On March 8, 1991, El Hage signed in to visit El Sayyid Nosair at the Riker’s 
Island (prison).  Nosair was serving a sentence for gun charges stemming from the Meir 
Kahane murder case” (Zill, 2001). Nosair, like El-Hage’s other associate Abouhalima, 
was convicted for his role in the first World Trade Center bombing (Zill, 2001).   
In early 1992, El-Hage and his family were living in Arlington, Texas (Zill, 
2001).   But, by the spring of 1992, he moved the family to Khartoum, Sudan to work 
directly for Usama Bin Ladin (Peraino & Thomas, 2002). He was paid a salary of $1,200 
per month, (Peraino & Thomas, 2002) which was the salary Usama Bin Ladin paid to his 
“highest officers” (Al-Ridi, 2001).  According to El-Hage, he was hired to work in the 
various companies in Khartoum by Usama Bin Ladin because he had an American 
passport, which allowed El-Hage to travel freely and purchase items for Usama Bin 
Ladin (Miranda, 2001). “These companies were operated to provide income to support al 
Qaeda and to provide cover for the procurement of explosives, weapons and chemicals 
and for the travel of al Qaeda operatives” (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, p. 
13).  
One of El-Hage’s job titles was “Director of International Marketing and 
Purchasing,” (Peraino & Thomas, 2002) but he really served as Bin Ladin’s personal 
assistant (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, p. 13).  Usama Bin Ladin’s front-
company, known as Wadi al-Aqiq, is where the terrorist leader had his office as chairman 
and Wadih El-Hage’s own office was just down the hall (Al-Ridi, 2001).  
In 1994, El-Hage was transferred to Nairobi, Kenya for al-Qaeda’s purposes 
(Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, p. 13). He was the group’s most senior 
person in Kenya (Reeve, 1999, p. 198). While there, he helped establish other al-Qaeda 
front companies in support of the plans to attack the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. These 
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companies included an alleged charitable group called Help Africa People and a 
gemstone trading business called Tanzanite King (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 
1998, p. 13). Help Africa People provided him and another al-Qaeda operative a 
convenient excuse to range throughout Africa. Tanzanite King was an alleged gem-stone 
business dealing in the semi-precious stone named after that country. As Help Africa 
People’s alleged purposes would provide scant reason for him to travel or have contacts 
to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Tanzanite King provided him with the other half of his 
necessary cover to travel to these regions on al-Qaeda business, this time under the guise 
of buying and selling semi-precious gems. Years later, when El-Hage was living in 
Arlington, Texas, Tanzanite King “business” was still being used by El-Hage’s associates 
to explain questionable money transfers associated with this terrorist.16 
Under these covers, he was assisting al-Qaeda operatives like U.S. Embassy 
Nairobi bomber Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, also known as Harun Fazul, who lived 
occasionally in El-Hage’s residence and was employed by him at Help Africa People 
(Miranda, 2001). Fazul rented the house where the al-Qaeda cell assembled the truck 
bomb used against the embassy and also drove one of the vehicles during the attack 
(Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998) 
In the summer of 1997, under pressure by the FBI and Kenyan Police, El-Hage 
and his family left Kenya and returned to Arlington, Texas, but the operation to destroy 
the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and in Tanzania continued (Peraino & Thomas, 2002). In 
Texas, El-Hage worked in a run-down tire store in Fort Worth, Texas.  In September and 
October 1997, El-Hage was questioned by both a federal grand jury and FBI agents about 
al-Qaeda’s activities, to which he provided false answers (Center for Non-Proliferation 
Studies, 1998). Even under this scrutiny, El-Hage maintained contact with other al-Qaeda 
operatives (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998).   
On August 7, 1998, the East Africa al-Qaeda cell El-Hage helped to establish 
bombed the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Al Salaam, Tanzania (Center for 
Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998).   
                                                 
16 Author’s recollection based upon investigative activities involving El-Hage when he lived in Texas. 
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On August 20, 1998, El-Hage was twice interviewed by the author regarding his 
connections with al-Qaeda, to which he provided numerous false answers.  
In September 1998, El-Hage was arrested by the FBI for his perjures testimony 
and lies to FBI agents, including the author. He was later indicted on charges related to 
the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi.  
In May 2001, he was tried, and convicted for his role in the bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Nairobi, which killed at least 212 people and injured more than 4,500 (Center 
for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998). El-Hage is now serving a life sentence at the 
“Supermax” prison in Florence, Colorado. 
3. With which Category of Al-Qaeda, Using Hoffman’s Definitions, did 
the Subject have an Association?  
Wadih El-Hage was a member of al-Qaeda Central. El-Hage had direct access to 
Usama Bin Ladin (UBL)and other top military leaders of al-Qaeda’s “military 
committee,” such as Muhammed Atef and Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri (Center for Non-
Proliferation Studies, 1998).   
He served as UBL’s personal secretary in Khartoum, Sudan from approximately 
1992-1994, coinciding when the group’s activities were headquartered there from 1991-
1996 (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998). He later played a lead role in 
organizing al-Qaeda’s East Africa Cell, which was responsible for one of the group’s 
most successful attacks. As Hoffman noted in his description of al-Qaeda Central, “The 
professional cadre is responsible for the signature terrorist attacks of the organization on 
the scale of 9/11 and the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania” (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 286). As a member of al-Qaeda Central, his value as an 
intelligence source would have been extremely high, assuming he could be recruited.  
4. What was the Subject’s Level of Risk and Commitment with His Al-
Qaeda Category? 
The brief background provided of El-Hage’s life is filled with evidence that he 
was fully committed to the cause and was willing to engage in activities of great risk for 
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his cause. Starting with his conversion to Islam as a teenager, his commitment to his new 
religion resulted in his ouster from his immediate family. He seemed to continually meet 
with individuals who were active militants engaged in various crimes, including murder, 
or had associations with individuals who were murdered. It could be argued that these 
close brushes with murdered individuals, Khalifa and Shalabi, and at least two of the first 
World Trade Center bombers, Abouhalima and Nosair, would have been sufficient cause 
for most people to question the direction of their life. Yet, El-Hage’s subsequent 
activities only deepened into more nefarious activities.    
Later, he is noted repeatedly traveling to the Afghan jihad, undertaking activities, 
such as smuggling, which would have involved greater risk, even if not in a war-zone.  
One quote from his wife’s interview with Newsweek seems to sum up his high level of 
commitment during the Afghan jihad, when considering he was an alleged volunteer: “He 
told his wife that he had shaved his head to keep bugs out while he slept in caves” 
(Peraino & Thomas, 2002).    
El-Hage continued this path of taking great risks and being fully committed to his 
cause when he was formally involved with al-Qaeda Central. He is widely regarded as 
having assisted in the development of al-Qaeda’s East Africa network and was directly 
involved with other al-Qaeda terrorists who bombed the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, such 
as Harun al-Fazul, whom he regularly had over to his home. He was trusted with other 
sensitive projects by Usama Bin Ladin, such as arranging for the purchase of his personal 
jet aircraft and the transfer of the group’s stinger missiles when al-Qaeda moved from the 
Sudan back to Afghanistan. (Al-Ridi, 2001). He admitted that he traveled the world on 
behalf of Usama Bin Ladin as a purchasing agent because of the freedom of movement 
afforded him as an American Citizen and passport holder. El-Hage’s direct connections 
to Usama Bin Ladin and other top al-Qaeda figures ensured that he was exposed to police 
and intelligence agencies soon after Usama Bin Ladin’s became identified as a terrorist 
threat.  Nevertheless, this did not curtail El-Hage’s association with al-Qaeda Central or 
its activities.    
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El-Hage had ample opportunities to extract himself from this jihadist lifestyle, 
while still being fully capable of claiming that he had his done his part for his religion. 
Instead, he continued to accept positions and assignments of increasing risk, which would 
only have been entrusted to someone fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin’s plan and 
fully trusted by him personally. El-Hage, as an American citizen with a college degree 
from the United States, had other life options which he choose to ignore, even when it 
created discomfort to himself, his wife and seven children (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).     
5. Did the Subject Display Instrumental or Emotional Aggression? 
El-Hage was very aware that he was under the scrutiny of the U.S. government 
and a possible target of criminal prosecution. This would have been apparent by his 
multiple interviews with the FBI and his summons to testify before grand juries, to say 
nothing of any possible surveillance or investigative activities he may have been able to 
detect on his own conducted by the FBI or other police or intelligence agencies. The U.S. 
government sought El-Hage’s assistance on al-Qaeda matters, which may have 
substantially extricated him from criminal liability. Even his wife and mother-in-law saw 
this as a path for him to extricate himself from his problems. One intercepted 
conversation from El-Hage’s mother-in-law (Brown) to April Ray is particularly telling: 
“You know,” said Brown “if they [the FBI agents] were smart they would have tried to 
enlist El-Hage’s help. If they were smart” (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).   
He chose to remain committed to al-Qaeda and continuously lied to the FBI about 
the extent and nature of his al-Qaeda contacts and al-Qaeda’s activities, at great peril to 
himself. Based on the role he played in establishing al-Qaeda’s East Africa cells, 
including associations with al-Qaeda wanted terrorist Harun al-Fazul and others, it is 
certain he was aware of the planning behind the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in East 
Africa. Yet, he provided no information to prevent these attacks.      
When examined in the light of McCauley’s suggestion that “emotional aggression 
should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental 
aggression more sensitive,” (McCauley, 2007, p. 22). El-Hage is assessed to have 
displayed emotional aggression. This is based on his intransigence to accept rewards 
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and/or avoid punishments which had been made to him by the FBI related to his potential 
intelligence value. If El-Hage had been motivated by instrumental aggression, it seems he 
would have reconsidered his options to “cut a deal” with the FBI once it was clear that he 
had been identified as al-Qaeda and that he was facing indictment in the murders of over 
two hundred people.  This option does not appear to have swayed him, in spite of the fact 
that he had a wife and seven children dependent on him, which he might never see again 
if convicted. This author would argue that this is an example of an individual failing to 
calculate the long-term consequences, which is associated with emotional aggression. 
Interestingly, the author is unaware of any personal incident in El-Hage’s life which 
could explain his emotional aggression and the need to strike out to hurt someone, in this 
case, the United States via the attacks on the U.S. Embassies. As a Muslim convert, does 
this possibly suggests that his anger and need to belong to al-Qaeda, and then to protect 
al-Qaeda at great personal cost to he and his family, was fueled by adopted “perceptions,” 
“feelings,” and “subjective sense of injustice” to his new religion as explained by Fathali 
Moghaddam (2006, p. 46)?  
One portion of the author’s discussion with El-Hage is insightful of the 
impractical, Type A goals he seemed to be pursuing: 
Q. During the interview, did you ask Mr. El Hage why it was that Bin 
Laden hated Americans? 
A. Yes. His answer was, he said that any true believing Muslim, it was the 
duty of any true believing Muslim to drive out the US from the Saudi 
peninsula because the Koran had reserved the Saudi peninsula only for 
Muslims. He also said that the US government unfairly supported Israel, 
and by that he described his statement by saying that the US was quick to 
come to the aid of Israel if something happened to it but that if Israel did 
something illegal that the US was slow to act. 
And then he also said that Israel was expanding to take control of the 
entire Middle East. And finally in response to that questioning, he said that 
many people wanted to make the world live according to the Koran, but 
that they don’t have the resources, but Bin Laden has the resources to 
make the world live according to the Koran. 
During that answer, he often switched between using he for Bin Laden and 
we when describing the hatred to the US and the West. (Miranda, 2001, 
pp. 3057-3058) 
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This statement may have been hyperbole on El-Hage’s part, but based on his 
seriousness when making this statement, it occurred to this author to be reflective of El-
Hage’s genuine feelings and desires; this must be rated as a rather nebulous and un-
pragmatic goal, which is characteristic of Type A terrorists.  
6. Was the Subject a Part-time or Full-time Jihadist? 
While conducting al-Qaeda’s business in Khartoum or Nairobi, El-Hage was 
unquestionably a full-time jihadist. In fact, as noted earlier, he received a full-time salary 
of $1,200 from Usama Bin Laden, which was the highest paid to anyone in the 
Khartoum-based front companies. When he moved to Nairobi with his family, at the 
directions of Usama Bin Ladin, his employment cover was with the alleged charity, 
“Help Africa People,” for which it is not known if he received a salary.  He also was 
allegedly involved in the sale of tanzanite, a semi-precious stone.  Both activities 
provided cover for El-Hage’s presence and movements in East Africa, as well as abroad.  
It is therefore difficult to describe him at this time also as being simply a part-time 
jihadist.  Both El-Hage’s work with Help Africa People and Tanzanite King must not 
have provided very much income, if any at all, as his described socio-economic status 
and residence in Kenya were poor and abysmal.17 Similarly, when he was forced to 
return to the United States by the U.S. government and Kenyan authorities, which 
occurred prior to the bombings, his socio-economic status and residence in Arlington, 
Texas, where he settled, could equally be described as poor and abysmal.18  Although 
fluent in English and college educated, El-Hage settled for menial under-employment 
changing and repairing flat tires at a third-world style, cinder-block business in an 
impoverished area of Fort Worth, Texas.  His apartment, likewise, was notably dingy and 
impoverished.  When he was forced by the authorities to leave Kenya and he returned to 
Arlington, Texas he did not sever his ties with individuals linked to al-Qaeda.  His in-
group still was compromised of individuals linked directly to al-Qaeda, individuals with a 
 
                                                 
17 Author’s recollection of conversations with FBI agents present during the search of El-Hage’s 
Nairobi residence. 
18 Author’s observations of El-Hage’s Arlington Apartment from his August 20, 1998 interview. 
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history of supporting armed jihad or individuals suspected of supporting the aims of al-
Qaeda.  For many years then, El-Hage’s “employment” is assessed as being a full-time 
jihadist.  
7. Did the Subject Exhibit Signs of Low or High Social Intensity 
Syndrome? 
Based on observations of El-Hage and knowledge of his background, he is 
assessed as having a high-level of SIS.  One factor in this assessment is his involvement 
in multiple jihads. Even after his marriage in 1986, El-Hage returned to Pakistan to again 
participate in the jihad (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).      
His assignments from one difficult third-world country to another (Pakistan, 
Sudan, Kenya) on behalf of his ideological beliefs are suggestive of a pattern which 
placed his loyalty to his male dominated social group (al-Qaeda Central) over the comfort 
and safety of his growing family.   
One interesting note in this pattern is what occurred while he was residing in 
Tucson. As noted, he was employed there assisting the jihad by working for the magazine 
Bunyan al Mahrsous. As a mouthpiece for the Afghan jihad, this magazine had an 
important fundraising and propaganda role in the United States to draw Muslims into the 
jihad (Al-Ridi, 2001). However, working for the jihad’s cause in this manner must not 
have been fulfilling to el-Hage, for he subsequently returned to Pakistan for a second 
tour, this time with his bride in tow. This vignette seems to be very consistent with Dr. 
Zimbardo’s (2008) description of the soldier who returns home from combat duty, 
quickly becomes bored with home life and is draw back to his intense, dangerous former 
lifestyle and the male-grouping he shared this lifestyle with. Finally, as predicted in one 
of Zimbardo’s (2008) behavioral predictions for high levels of SIS, he is known to have 
visited at least one business specializing in pornography.    
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8. Case Study Conclusions 
As stated initially, El-Hage is a Type A terrorist. He was not migrating to the 
Type B set at the time of his arrest, which coincided with the author’s contact. This 
assessment is based upon his unwillingness to cooperate with the FBI, even when not to 
do so was obviously ruinous.    
When examined by the lenses discussed above, these also lead to an assessment of 
El-Hage as a Type A terrorist, which is consistent with his assessment based on what is 
known of his ultimate failure to cooperate when it was in his interests to do so.  First, El-
Hage had a long history of positions of great risk and commitment within al-Qaeda 
(Usama Bin Ladin’s personal secretary and establishment of the group’s East Africa 
cells). Second, his rather un-pragmatic goal of making the whole world Muslim through 
the efforts of Usama Bin Ladin speaks of emotional and not instrumental aggression. This 
is a goal without ends. And, as one can see from Usama Bin Ladin’s track records, 
fatwas, and public threats, this goal could only be met by hurting others. It would be 
inconceivable that El-Hage did not know Usama Bin Ladin’s position on violence. Third, 
he has a long-history of full-time participation as a jihadist, even pre-dated al-Qaeda’s 
existence.  His full-time jihadist positions included not only under-employment in menial 
positions suited to his cover and below his education level, but even as a salaried 
employee of Usama Bin Ladin’s front companies. Fourth, he exhibited factors suggesting 
high levels of Social Identity Syndrome, such as his multiple returns to dangerous jobs in 
dangerous and generally perceived undesirable places in the world, which placed his 
group-affiliation above his family’s comfort and health.  
Based on these criteria, it would have been possible to assess El-Hage as a Type 
A terrorist prior to any recruitment attempt. El-Hage had excellent access to intelligence, 
but consistent with his Type A status, he was uncooperative and was probably not 
recruitable as an intelligence source, in spite of the suggestions by his mother-in-law to 
his wife that he should be recruited.  
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XII. CASE STUDY TWO: ESSAM AL-RIDI 
A. ESSAM AL-RIDI 
U.S. citizen; jihadist; associate of Wadih el-Hage; pilot for Usama Bin Laden; 
witness for the U.S. government. 
1. Is the Subject a Type A or Type B Terrorist? 
Al-Ridi is a Type B individual.  As will be discussed, he was very cooperative 
with the FBI when approached for assistance.   
2. What is the Subject’s Background? 
Essam al-Ridi is an American citizen who was born in Cairo, Egypt in 1958 (Al-
Ridi, 2001). When he was approximately five years of age, he moved to Kuwait and 
remained there for approximately 23 years (Al-Ridi, 2001). While technically an 
Egyptian, he thinks of himself as Kuwaiti.19  After completing high school there, he 
moved to Karachi, Pakistan for approximately three to four years to study for a degree in 
electrical engineering, which he did not complete (Al-Ridi, 2001).      
In 1979, he traveled to Fort Worth, Texas to obtain his pilots license, which he 
completed in 1981. For many years thereafter, both inside and outside of the United 
States, al-Ridi worked as both a flight instructor and a pilot for various commercial 
airliners.20  
In approximately 1982, while attending a Muslim Arab Youth Association 
(MAYA) convention in Fort Worth, he heard Abdullah Azzam speak on the individual 
Islamic duty of Muslims to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet 
Union (Al-Ridi, 2001). At approximately this same time, al-Ridi met Wadi el-Hage, 
while the latter was still a student the University of Southwest Louisiana. (Al-Ridi, 2001).  
                                                 
19 Based on author’s interaction with Al-Ridi from approximately 2000-2006. 
20 Ibid. 
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Inspired by Azzam, al-Ridi took his family and left to join the Arab contingent of 
the anti-Soviet jihad in Peshawar, Pakistan in either 1982 or 1983 (Al-Ridi, 2001). While 
there, in 1983, al-Ridi again ran into El-Hage (Al-Ridi, 2001). For approximately the next 
18 months, al-Ridi assisted the jihad as a purchasing agent, traveling around the world 
buying supplies for the mujahidin including night vision goggles, scuba gear, and range 
finders (Al-Ridi, 2001). It was during this time that he also met Usama Bin Ladin on 
several occasions.  
In approximately 1985, al-Ridi decided to return to the United States (Al-Ridi, 
2001). One reason he returned was because his Egyptian passport he was using 
extensively to travel with on behalf of procuring materials for the mujahidin was about to 
expire (Al-Ridi, 2001). The other was more personal. Al-Ridi opposed the decision 
making role Usama Bin Ladin was appropriating for himself in the jihad.  He openly 
expressed his beliefs that Usama Bin Ladin, as essentially someone who was uneducated 
and untested in military matters, should not be entitled to make military decisions which 
could cost lives simply because he was wealthy (Al-Ridi, 2001).    
Upon his return to the United States, al-Ridi did not totally divorce himself from 
supporting the jihad. He continued to serve the cause essentially as a procurement 
specialist. On one occasion, in approximately 1987 or 1998, he provided night vision 
goggles to El-Hage, who returned with them to Pakistan in his passenger luggage (Al-
Ridi, 2001). In another instance, he purchased and shipped 25 Barrett-brand .50 caliber 
sniper rifles, some of which ended in the hands of Usama Bin Ladin (Al-Ridi, 2001). Al-
Ridi later returned to Afghanistan in approximately 1989 at the request of the mujahidin 
to sight-in the scopes mounted on these weapons (Al-Ridi, 2001).    
In approximately 1992 or 1993, al-Ridi was requested to provide assistance, this 
time by Wadih El-Hage, while the El-Hage was living in Khartoum as an employee of 
Usama Bin Ladin (Al-Ridi, 2001).21 El-Hage contracted with al-Ridi to purchase a jet 
aircraft with an unrefueled flying range of two thousand miles on behalf of Usama Bin 
Ladin (Al-Ridi, 2001). El-Hage was later to explain to al-Ridi that the plane was 
                                                 
21 Al-Ridi originally described the time frame as 1993, but upon cross-examination agreed he may 
have begun his search for an aircraft in 1992. See page 613 of his testimony. 
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necessary for shipping Usama Bin Ladin’s stinger missiles from Peshawar to Khartoum 
(Al-Ridi, 2001). In 1993, after purchasing and refurbishing a jet aircraft, al-Ridi flew 
Usama Bin Ladin’s jet to him in Khartoum, Sudan (Al-Ridi, 2001). On the day of his 
arrival in Khartoum, al-Ridi turned over the keys to the plane to Usama Bin Ladin during 
a dinner with him at his guest house, which included other key members of al-Qaeda, 
many of whom were armed with assault weapons (Al-Ridi, 2001).     
The following day, al-Ridi had a private meeting with Usama Bin Ladin in his 
office at the Wadi Al-Aqiq company during which al-Ridi was offered a full-time 
position with the company at a salary of $1,200 per month (Al-Ridi, 2001). Al-Ridi’s job 
responsibilities would have included working as Usama Bin Ladin’s pilot, establishing a 
crop dusting operation for his agricultural interests, and establishing a cargo shipping 
company to ship produce from Usama Bin Ladin’s agricultural interests to other countries 
(Al-Ridi, 2001); he declined the offer because he thought the salary was insufficient (Al-
Ridi, 2001). Al-Ridi then returned to the United States.  Several months later, however, 
he returned to Khartoum at the request of El-Hage to fly Usama Bin Ladin’s jet to 
Nairobi with five Arabs associated with the al-Qaeda front company, Wadi al-Aqiq, for a 
purpose unknown to al-Ridi (Al-Ridi, 2001). These five Arabs subsequently traveled 
from Nairobi on a smaller, shorter range aircraft to another destination unknown to al-
Ridi (Al-Ridi, 2001). The government’s indictment against Usama Bin Ladin, El-Hage 
and the other conspirators in the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in East Africa noted 
that during the same time frame as the travel of these five mysterious Arabs, al-Qaeda 
operatives were operating in Somalia to provide military assistance and training to the 
tribes opposed to the U.S. military presence there (Al-Ridi, 2001). Still in 1993, El-Hage 
requested al-Ridi’s assistance piloting the aircraft again.  On this occasion, during a test 
flight, the plane was destroyed when al-Ridi had a hydraulic failure which caused the 
brakes to fail during landing (Al-Ridi, 2001). Upon crashing the aircraft, al-Ridi 
immediately left the country, concerned by the possible consequences of a public 
association between himself and Usama Bin Ladin. As al-Ridi said the following in his 
testimony at the trial of the U.S. Embassy bombers: 
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I’m the only one who flew this aircraft.  Everybody knows that is Usama 
Bin Laden’s aircraft.  Everybody knew then that I’m Egyptian.  The 
Egyptians (Intelligence) are heavily available in Khartoum and I wouldn’t 
like to be seen in association with Usama at the time. So I was very 
concerned to leave. (Al-Ridi, 2001, pp. 591-592)  
In 1994, he became an American citizen (Al-Ridi, 2001). In 1998, al-Ridi met 
with El-Hage in Arlington, Texas while al-Ridi was in the United States on vacation with 
his family; this was their last meeting (Al-Ridi, 2001). Among other issues discussed, El-
Hage warned al-Ridi about the FBI’s raid of his residence in Nairobi in which his 
computer was seized, which might lead the FBI to question al-Ridi. 
In 1998, the FBI contacted al-Ridi while he was residing overseas and negotiated 
his return to the United States where he was interviewed regarding his association with 
Usama Bin Ladin, Wadih El-Hage, and other matters.22  
3. With which Category of Al-Qaeda, Using Hoffman’s Definitions, did 
the Subject have an Association?  
If Al-Ridi was ever a member of al-Qaeda, which he has always denied, then he 
would be regarded as a member of al-Qaeda Central. This assessment is established based 
upon his direct connections to known al-Qaeda Central figures, especially El-Hage and 
Usama Bin Ladin.  
However, if he was never a member of al-Qaeda, his description under Hoffman’s 
categories becomes more problematic.  He might be considered an “Al-Qaeda local.” As 
described earlier in this paper, Al-Qaeda locals represent:  
‘al-Qaeda adherents’ who are likely to have had terrorism experience and 
who may have participated in one or more jihads around the world.  The 
unique aspect of this group is that its members have a connection to al-
Qaeda, even if these connections are “tenuous” or “dormant. (Hoffman, 
2006, p. 287) 
                                                 
22 Recollection of author as one of the individuals who contacted and assisted in Al-Ridi’s return to 
the United States. 
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Al-Ridi is qualified under this description as having participated in the Afghan 
jihad, and through his on-call assistance to El-Hage and Usama Bin Ladin, which might 
be interpreted as “tenous” or “dormant” connections. The problem with this description is 
that al-Ridi did not appear to be an ideological adherent of Usama Bin Ladin. Had he 
been, it seems less likely he would have refused Usama Bin Ladin’s employment offer.  
Nevertheless, if al-Ridi was not an ideological adherent, it seems unlikely that Usama Bin 
Ladin would have offered al-Ridi such a sensitive job, in what amounted to al-Qaeda’s 
headquarters at that time, had there not been some level of trust and affinity between the 
two men.  After all, Usama Bin Ladin was already involved in terrorist activities by the 
time the job offer was made.  Likewise, El-Hage certainly would not have divulged to al-
Ridi that the terrorist leader required assistance transporting stinger missiles from 
Pakistan to the Sudan had he not trusted al-Ridi to some extent.   
This difficulty raises an important point. To the outside observer, such as an FBI 
agent working from scraps of intelligence reporting, al-Ridi almost certainly would have 
appeared to be an al-Qaeda Central figure.  This would be a good assessment based upon 
al-Ridi’s participation in the Afghan jihad and his repeated contacts with top al-Qaeda 
figures including Usama Bin Ladin and El-Hage.  From this assessment, it would have 
been logical to assume he was an adherent to al-Qaeda’s ideology or another fawning 
member of Usama Bin Ladin’s troop. The result of this logical path may have been to see 
al-Ridi as unapproachable and someone unlikely to assist.  In fact, prior to contacting al-
Ridi, the author and his FBI partner were advised by other counter-terrorism investigators 
that Al-Ridi was a “hard core” al-Qaeda member who would never cooperate. This 
incorrect assumption about al-Riddi’s hard core nature is a good example of 
Correspondence Inference Theory at work. But, this assessment was obviously not the 
case.  Individuals in contact with known al-Qaeda members then, including former 
jihadists, cannot be automatically assumed to share al-Qaeda’s ideology, commitment, or 
beyond the ability of the FBI to establish a cooperative arrangement.   
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4. What was the Subject’s Level of Risk and Commitment with His Al-
Qaeda Category? 
While al-Ridi was in contact with key al-Qaeda figures and had great access to 
activities which would have been of exceptional intelligence value to the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, his level of commitment never approached his Type A 
associate. El-Hage’s commitment to his Islamic cause brought him back to the Afghan 
jihad several times, for extended periods. Al-Ridi, by contrast, spent 18 months in 
Pakistan, in arguably a less risky job than El-Hage, and returned to the United States to 
assist the jihad in less direct, certainly less risky and more comfortable surroundings.  It 
wasn’t that al-Ridi wasn’t committed to jihad, but his risk level was much more akin to a 
Type B individual, not a Type A terrorist like El-Hage, who was willing to sleep in bug 
infested caves for his cause.  Al-Ridi’s point on this matter in his testimony is instructive:  
A. Let me clarify. The fact that I left physically from Peshawr was not in 
any mean or shape would remove me feeling a commitment to the cause. 
Q. Right. But there were just things that were happening in Peshawr, and 
this you did not agree with? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And you did not want to participate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you still felt dedicated to Jihad? 
A. Yes. (Al-Ridi, 2001, p. 606) 
5. Did the Subject Display Instrumental or Emotional Aggression? 
Al-Ridi displayed instrumental aggression. His involvement with the nascent al-
Qaeda organization was primarily through his participation in the anti-Soviet jihad and 
then on a contractual and financial basis via El-Hage, who was an associate from this 
jihad.  Unlike the Type A terrorists, who would be expected to roll from one jihad into 
another, never satisfied with any results, al-Ridi played his cameo roles and would then 
return to his normal life as an airline pilot and father.  
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Al-Ridi calculated the long-term consequences of his actions, which were evident 
in small events. He did not stay with the jihad in Pakistan when his passport was about to  
expire; he knew to leave the Sudan when his association with Usama Bin Ladin might be 
exposed after the plane crash; and he knew cooperation with the FBI was better than 
running.   
If al-Ridi was ever motivated by emotional aggression, it is hard to determine 
what it was. Certainly, his aggression was not sufficient to generate a willingness to take 
great risks. And, as discussed, his commitment was much more akin to a Type B 
individual who is happy to participate and contribute from the periphery and not the 
center of activity.     
Finally, as predicted by McCauley, the emotionally aggressive El-Hage did not 
respond to potential rewards and punishments, even when others like his mother-in-law 
and wife saw the value in his cooperation with the FBI.  Al-Ridi, as predicted by 
McCauley for someone assessed to be motivated by instrumental aggression, was 
obviously much more receptive.   
6. Was the Subject a Part-time or Full-time Jihadist? 
Aside from 18 months in al-Ridi spent in Pakistan, he was never a full-time 
jihadist, unlike his friend El-Hage. Al-Ridi was always gainfully employed and was 
always very social; he never severed his ties with Western society.23  Although it was El-
Hage who had the college degree, it was Al-Ridi who was employed in a respected 
profession, dressed in tailored western clothing, and was not adverse to the benefits of 
money.  Al-Ridi was unlikely to commit himself full-time to the jihad (unlike El-Hage) 
because this would force him to sever ties to a Western society he actually enjoyed, a 
prestigious job, wealth, and stability for his family. Again, al-Ridi contributed in the 
manner of a Type B individual. That is, it was from the periphery, with less risk and only 
occasionally when it was of benefit to him.   
                                                 
23 Author’s observations of Al-Ridi from 2000-2005. 
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7. Did the Subject Exhibit Signs of Low or High Social Intensity 
Syndrome? 
Al-Ridi placed greater value on his family and career than on inclusion in the 
intense, elitist, male-dominated al-Qaeda or the jihad in Afghanistan. This was clearly 
demonstrated in his denial to work for Usama Bin Ladin, but it was also shown by his 
return to the United States after his 18 months in Afghanistan. Even after he was re-
exposed to jihadist training camps, during the time he was sighting-in the .50 caliber 
sniper rifles, this experience did not reinvigorate his return. Had he been experiencing 
high levels of SIS, exposure to these intense male-dominated social settings should have 
presumably impacted him more significantly, but they did not.    
Al-Ridi’s return to these camps over a period of time, some of which were in 
active war zones, might be argued to be a sign of SIS.  And, when discussing his jihadist 
participation in the 1980’s, a similar  argument could be made that he was more involved 
in intense male-dominated social groupings and may have had high levels of SIS at that 
time.  Overall, however, he did not stay involved with the group, was never a full-time 
jihadist, and most importantly, he chose to leave the group when others did not. After his 
18 month experience in Peshawr on behalf of the jihad, he never again apparently placed 
jihad above his family comfort or even his career.  
Al-Ridi was only partially committed to the jihad, was involved with al-Qaeda 
indirectly in relatively low-risk activities, did not display a high level of Social Intensity 
Syndrome and declined to advance his association with al-Qaeda over both money and 
ideological disagreements.  When asked to assist the FBI, he did.  
8. Case Study Conclusions 
As stated initially, al-Ridi is a Type B terrorist. This assessment is based upon his 
willingness to cooperate with the FBI, even publicly, against his former associates. When 
examined by the lenses discussed above, these also lead to an assessment of al-Ridi as a 
Type B individual, which is consistent with his assessment based on what is known of his 
cooperation, which was in his interests.  First, with respect to the issue of risk and 
commitment, al-Ridi took some risks, but generally stayed on the periphery of the 
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group’s more dangerous activities. He openly declined to accept positions of greater risk, 
such as being Usama Bin Ladin’s salaried employee at what amounted to al-Qaeda’s 
headquarters at the time. Even during the pre-al-Qaeda, anti-Soviet Jihad, al-Ridi’s 
involvement was one generally of procurement. When compared to the involvement of 
El-Hage, it was not nearly as extensive or risky. Second, al-Ridi displayed instrumental 
aggression. He assisted in the anti-Soviet jihad and then returned home. He would take-
on jobs contracted by El-Hage and would then return to his normal life. His involvement 
then had a defined purpose, which did not lead continually from one cause to another.  
This leads to the third point. Al-Ridi could only possibly be considered a full-time 
jihadist for a brief period of time in the early 1980’s, which pre-dated al-Qaeda’s 
existence. This more dedicated involvement in Pakistan apparently did not fit him well 
and he left after approximately 18 months.  Since that time, he has always been employed 
full-time in work outside of supporting jihadist activities, mainly as an international 
airline pilot. Unlike El-Hage, there was no employment with jihadist newspapers, jihadist 
recruitment centers, or al-Qaeda front organizations in the Sudan or Kenya. Al-Ridi had 
real attachments to society through his real profession. Fourth, al-Ridi exhibited factors 
suggesting low levels of Social Identity Syndrome. These are highlighted by his 
peripheral positions with the anti-Soviet jihad, his ability not to be sucked back into 
jihadist activity after visiting jihadist camps to deliver procured materials, and even his 
ability to turn-down Usama Bin Ladin’s offer of paid employment.  
Based on these criteria, it would have been possible to assess al-Ridi as a Type B 
individual prior to any recruitment attempt, in spite of his reputation as being a “hard-
core” terrorist beyond reasoning. Finally, as demonstrated by al-Ridi’s testimony, even as 
a Type B, he also had excellent access to intelligence which made him a valuable 
recruitment target.  
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XIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Human intelligence can provide some of the most useful actionable 
intelligence.  But it requires painstaking work in recruiting informants 
who are already in terrorist organizations or placing informants not yet in 
them. (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 129) 
Seth G. Jones & Martin C. Libicki 
The elimination of terrorism is a noble endeavor which must be pursued, but the 
historical record on terrorism supports the argument that it is perpetual and enduring.  
Terrorism has existed for several thousand years and has even been interpreted as “a 
modern form of primitive warfare” (Wheeler, 1991, p. 19). It is, therefore, ironic that 
although terrorism as a phenomenon has existed since ancient times, most modern 
terrorist groups are fragile and ephemeral. Audrey Kruth Cronin, in her article “How al-
Qaida Ends; The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” citing David Rapoport, noted 
that “90 percent of terrorist organizations have a life span of less than one year; and of 
those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade” (Cronin, 2006, p. 
13). 
In data examined by Dr. Seth Jones and Dr. Martin Libicki, “two-thirds of all 
terrorist groups active since 1968 have fewer than 100 members” (Jones & Libicki, 2008, 
p. 31). The paucity of membership in most groups, therefore, allows for only so many 
setbacks, arrests, deaths or defections. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda has bettered these 
percentages and continues to evolve from a comparatively fragile, hierarchal 
organization, to a more resilient, dispersed network and movement. Bruce Reidel, Senior 
Fellow at the Brookings Institute, expressed this sentiment in his article for Foreign 
Affairs in 2007: 
The challenge of defeating al Qaeda is more complex today than it was in 
2001.  The organization is more diffuse, and its components operate more 
independently.  Bin Laden continues to influence its direction and provide 
general guidance and, on occasion, specific instructions.  But overall the 
movement is more loosely structured, which leaves room for independent 
and copycat terrorist operations. (p. 5) 
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Expressed organizationally, al-Qaeda is becoming less and less like a vulnerable 
“spider” with a head and body and more like a decentralized and resilient “starfish” 
which does not have a head and which has the added ability to regenerate lost appendages 
(Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006).  
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki (2008) write that modern terrorist groups come to 
their demise through policing, military force, splintering, politics, or victory. They define 
“policing” as “the use of police and intelligence units to collect information on terrorist 
groups, penetrate cells, and arrest key members” (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 11).  
Martha Crenshaw concluded years earlier that terrorism declines because of three 
factors: “Physical defeat of the extremist organization, by the government, the group’s 
decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational disintegration” (Crenshaw, 
1991, p. 70).  
And Audrey Kruth Cronin provides seven critical elements leading to the demise 
of modern terrorist groups: “(1) capture or killing of the leader, (2) failure to transition to 
the next generation, (3) achievement of the group’s aims, (4) transition to legitimate 
political process, (5) undermining of popular support, (6) repression, and (7) transition 
from terrorism to other forms of violence” (Cronin, 2006, pp. 17-18). 
These three independent reviews of the broad reasons for the demise of modern 
terrorist groups are clearly consistent. Jones and Libicki’s factor “politics,” for instance, 
is essentially encompassing of Crenshaw’s “decision to abandon the terrorist strategy,” 
and Cronin’s “transition to legitimate political process.” Likewise, Jones and Libicki’s 
“policing” could be included in Crenshaw’s “physical defeat of the extremist 
organization,” and Cronin’s reasons “(1) capture or killing of the leader,” “(6) 
repression,” and possibly reasons (2) and (5), depending on their interpretation.     
Most importantly, for purposes of this thesis, of the ways terrorist groups end, 
analysis of data on terrorist groups since 1968 by Jones and Libicki supports their demise 
primarily through two of these processes (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Forty three percent of 
terrorist groups end through adoption of nonviolent means and inclusion in the political 
process and 40 percent cease to exist through policing (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Based on 
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these finding, Jones and Libicki suggests a departure from combating al-Qaeda via the 
current military-centric strategy to one which plays to several existing and developing 
strengths of the FBI:   
Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups end, a more effective 
approach would be adopting a two-front strategy.  First, policing and 
intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. Efforts. [underscore added] In 
Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al 
Qa’ida consists of an amorphous network of individuals who need to be 
tracked down and arrested.  In Pakistan, for example, the most successful 
efforts to capture or kill al Qa’ida leaders after the September 2001 
attacks-such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu Faraj 
al-Libbi, and Abu Zubeida-occurred because of careful police and 
intelligence work, not military force. This strategy should include careful 
work abroad from such organizations as the CIA and FBI, as well as their 
cooperation with local police and intelligence agencies. (Jones & Libicki, 
2008, p. 124) 
Jones and Libicki’s conclusions that policing and intelligence are the strategy for 
success against al-Qaeda are also supported by Marc Sageman’s work on this group.  He 
argued the most effective tools to defeating al Qa’ida and the global Salafi Jihad “simply 
amount to good police work” (Sageman, 2004, p. 175 as cited in Jones and Libicki, 2008, 
p. 128).   
A key to good police work has always been the collection of intelligence.  As 
Jones and Libicki noted, “Human intelligence can provide some of the most useful 
actionable intelligence.  But it requires painstaking work in recruiting informants who are 
already in terrorist organizations or placing informants not yet in them” (Jones & Libicki, 
2008, p. 129). 
The FBI is well positioned as both a “policing” organization and an intelligence 
organization to contribute to the demise of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda through the 
recruitment of terrorist informants. Thinking, however, that any organization can simply 
mandate or will itself to improve the recruitment of terrorist sources, without a deeper 
understanding of the enemy’s psychology, is neither realistic, nor a true path to 
improvement. This thesis argues that the FBI can turn to two overlapping arenas for 
practical guidance in improving terrorist source recruitments.   
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One arena from which to draw guidance is the study of counter-ideological 
programs from around the world.  The war against radical Islamic ideologies fought 
abroad by U.S. allies through successful counter-ideological programs is of benefit to 
U.S. homeland security. When a reformed ideologue like Dr. Fadl or recalcitrant 
terrorists like Nasir Abas or Ali Imron, speak against radical ideologies, it is good for 
security in the United States, even when the message is delivered in Cairo or Jakarta.  
Since the Indonesian or Egyptian programs are succeeding in disrupting and 
disintegrating groups previously supportive of violence against allies and the United 
States, the FBI should support these efforts with the understanding that one less terrorist 
in Cairo or Jakarta might be one less terrorist attempting to travel to New York or Los 
Angeles.   
More directly for purposes of this thesis, the FBI should see these counter-
ideological programs as potentially destabilizing the ideologies of groups and individuals 
in the United States, from which it may benefit in terms of source recruitment.  In 
principle, the same counter-ideological techniques which force a terrorist to defect should 
be similar to the techniques used for source recruitment. The dissension and doubts 
created by counter-ideological programs against adherents of terrorism may cause subtle 
but important shifts in thinking affecting an individual’s risk and commitment for their 
group, their full-time commitment, their aggression or even the bonds to their terrorist in-
group.  Efforts of this kind may be useful in helping to prevent Type B individuals from 
becoming stable Type As.     
The counter-ideological programs of the countries discussed in this thesis derive 
their success in some part from advantages in their legal, cultural, and religious makeup, 
which the United States does not necessarily possess or replicate. But, the United States 
can nevertheless benefit from their successes if it extracts and applies what is miscible 
within the U.S. context.  
The second arena which can provide guidance is from academic work focused on 
the understanding of terrorism from the fields of psychology, political science, and 
sociology. Accepting the argument that terrorism is a perpetual and enduring threat and  
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that policing, with the use of human intelligence, is vital to defeating al-Qaeda, what is 
necessary to meet the demands of this threat is a new, long-term view of thinking about 
processes for the recruitment of terrorist sources.  
A cognitive process provides several advantages benefiting the FBI and the larger 
U.S. Intelligence Community beyond the current instinctual and individual approach to 
source recruiting, or those benefits which may be derived from changes to the 
organization’s bureaucratic structure. First, although there are individual agents 
successfully recruiting and operating terrorism sources, they do so via intuition and 
experience; they are un-replicable artists. But unfortunately, the Rembrandts and Picassos 
of the FBI are rare. The development of human intelligence (HUMINT) must be 
improved at the organizational level if the FBI is to keep pace with lone-wolves, 
autonomous cells, increasing decentralization, and groups with admirable histories of 
organizational learning, such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda (Trujillo, 2005).   
Second, a cognitive model for recruitment, unlike the current approach, can be 
taught, analyzed, compared, measured, adjusted, and become part of the FBI’s 
organizational learning process. A cognitive approach can be principled upon measurable 
evidence and scientific principles, as opposed to the current individual and instinctual 
approach. 
The result of the two case studies, summarized in Table 1 below, illustrate how 
one such cognitive model may exist in assessing potential terrorist source recruitments as 
either Type A or Type B terrorists.   
As proposed earlier in this thesis, it is the Type B individual who should be the 
primary focus of recruitment efforts. Even though they may operate within the context of 
a Type A organization, such as al-Qaeda, the Type Bs nevertheless approach the use of 
violence on an instrumental basis, which is predicted to be more responsive to rewards 
and punishments.   
This is precisely what was observed in the behaviors of Al-Ridi and El-Hage.  In 
spite of El-Hage’s handicap and meek appearance, as the Type A terrorist, he proved to 
be uncooperative and committed to the very end.  On the other hand, Al-Ridi, the Type B 
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individual who was once viewed as “hard core” and unapproachable, proved to be very 
cooperative. Agents recruiting sources comprehend the utility of rewards and 
punishments, but they will have greater success when they can discern the behaviors 
which point them to the individuals who are geared psychologically to be more 
responsive to these rewards and punishments. 






















































Low/Med Instrumental Part Low B Yes 
Type B individuals, like Al-Ridi, have instrumental aggression, which is intended 
to bring about a result; it is purposeful. As McCauley concluded, those terrorists 
displaying instrumental aggression should be more “sensitive” to “objective rewards and 
punishments” (McCauley, 2007, p. 22). When the “purpose” for these Type B individuals 
is obtained, these individuals can move off to non-terrorist pursuits.  This was observed 
with Al-Ridi. When he chose to end his active participation with the jihad in Afghanistan, 
he did not move into another jihad or cause, instead he returned to the United States to 
pursue his aviation career. When he did assist on occasions in the future, it was for a 
limited purpose and partially financially driven.      
The Type A terrorists, such as Wadih El-Hage, are possessed of emotional 
aggression, which “…is associated with anger and does not calculate long-term 
consequences. The reward of emotional aggression is hurting someone who has hurt you” 
(McCauley, 2007, p. 22). The Type A terrorists may never be satisfied and are unlikely to 
be satiated of the need to hurt someone. This description is very appropriate for El-Hage.  
This Type A terrorist moved from one front-line jihad tour to another, one suspicious 
murder to another, and one serious terrorist affiliation to another; this continued without a 
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significant pause for almost two decades. This may be what the Saudis recognized when 
in their counter-ideological program they eliminated takfiris who crossed the threshold of 
violence from participation in their programs, and while Davis and Jenkins saw that 
ultimately, Type A terrorists had to be arrested or eliminated.   
The Type B terrorists are more likely to display lower levels of risk and 
commitment than their Type A counterparts, often placing them on the periphery of the 
organization.  This was also observed with the two case studies.  At the periphery, within 
front groups or dawa organizations, they are more accessible to investigating agents.  
This provides agents with starting points in their search for Type B candidates.  As social 
networking analysis demonstrates, peripheral involvement within a terrorist organization 
does not equate to inferior access to important intelligence or denial to the interior 
workings of an organization. The access that Essam Al-Ridi had, for instance, could have 
provided superior intelligence on al-Qaeda activities leading-up to the bombings of the 
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, had he been recruited in time. As it were, his 
cooperation as a witness against El-Hage was still very valuable.   
In addition to viewing source targets through the lens of Type A and B 
classifications, greater insight into the predicted cooperativeness of potential al-Qaeda 
source candidates can be gained when they are simultaneously evaluated by other 
parameters discussed in this thesis. They must also be examined by their levels of risk 
and commitment, their part-time or full-time commitment to a jihad or their terrorist 
cause, and if they display signs of high or low Social Intensity Syndrome.   
As the analysis of the jihadi network responsible for the Madrid bombings 
demonstrated, the Type B terrorists are also more likely to be the part-time jihadists, not 
the fully committed individuals who sever their ties to society in support of their cause.  
This was consistent with the two examples. The first, Al-Ridi, was a professional airline 
pilot.  A generous description of his activities might be that he dabbled in supporting the 
jihad early and made money from it later. The second, El-Hage, was a professional jihadi. 
His career path was to move from one “job” supporting the jihad or al-Qaeda to another.  
These are worth quickly recapping: 
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 He worked in Afghanistan allegedly providing medical and religious 
items. 
 H served as an armed courier of “stuff” in Afghanistan. 
 H may have fought in Afghanistan. 
 He purchased guns for one of the future World Trade Center bombers. 
 He is tied to three murders within the United States. 
 He worked for a jihadist-propaganda magazine in Tucson. 
 He worked for the Maktab al-Khidimat in New York. 
 He worked as Usama Bin Ladin’s personal secretary in Sudan. 
 He traveled the world as a purchasing agent for al-Qaeda. 
 He worked for two front organizations which provided cover to himself 
and at least one other member of the East Africa al-Qaeda cell which 
destroyed the embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salaam.   
When reviewing the career paths of El-Hage and Al-Ridi under this full-time/part-
time lens (something agents may not be aware of), it seems almost ridiculous to ask who 
the better candidate was for cooperating with the FBI.     
Social Intensity Syndrome should also be applied in reviewing potential sources. 
Type B terrorists may feel the pull of belonging to an intense, male-dominated in-group, 
as surely a terrorist group must be, but they can overcome the attractions of these groups.  
They can attend or visit a training camp, such as al-Ridi did, but decide to forgo further 
involvement and retreat to their prior existence. The Type B individuals can be involved 
with these in-groups, but on the periphery and not to the extent that their need to be with 
the terrorist in-group overcomes their commitment to family and society at large. Al-Ridi 
managed to decline an offer to work for Usama Bin Ladin. Would many Type A terrorists 




As there is a demonstrable unwillingness of these part-time terrorists to fully 
extricate themselves from society, it seems illogical to conclude that they have fully  
committed themselves to a revolutionary restructuring of these same societies through a 
plan of violence.  This would require a higher level of personal risk and commitment than 
they appear to posses.   
Through the application of the suggestions in this thesis, FBI agents can gain a 
deeper insight into the histories and behaviors of their potential sources and the subjects 
of their investigations.  They can take facts about their targets and interpret their value. It 
is known now, for example, that there is value in information that an individual with 
access to suspected terrorists maintains his full-time job and societal contacts, while his 
suspected terrorist associates do the opposite.  There is value in knowing that an 
individual’s risk for his organization never trumped his commitment to family or work.  
There is value in knowing that amongst a terrorist cell, one member believes acts of 
violence are for a specific purpose and reason, while his counter-parts simply want to 
lash-out and hurt someone. All of these examples are clues about who is more likely to 
cooperate if approached by the FBI, and who is more likely to reject potential rewards 
and punishments, like Wadih El-Hage. 
In conclusion, those individuals who demonstrate traits leading to their 
classification as Type B terrorists are suggested to be more likely to cooperate in 
providing intelligence on terrorism matters, while their Type A counterparts are more 
likely to carry their cause with them to the jail or grave.  It is among the Type B terrorists 
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